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DARFUR, DIVESTMENT, AND DIALOGUE 
PERRY S. BECHKY* 
“Influencing the national government is part of an age-old 
function of state legislatures.  And that’s what we are 
doing.  We don’t believe that what we are doing is foreign 
policy.  Foreign policy would be us cutting a deal with 
some country.  That’s foreign policy.  We can’t do that.  But 
we can certainly influence; we can use our sovereignty and 
our capacity to raise and spend money to influence the 
foreign policy of this country.  And that’s what we are 
doing.”1 
–Byron Rushing, Massachusetts State Representative 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Divestment2 by state and local governments has emerged as 
one of the most visible responses in the United States to the 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.  I 
thank for their helpful comments: Paul Berman, Mark Janis, Patricia McCoy, 
Saikrishna Prakash, Kurt Strasser, and participants in the symposium on Trade 
Sanctions in a 21st Century Economy sponsored by the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, the conference on the Politics of 
International Economic Law sponsored by the International Economic Law 
Interest Group of the American Society of International Law, and the University 
of Connecticut Faculty Workshop.  I also thank Joanne Cossitt and Patrick Mott 
for research assistance.  All mistakes are my own.  The information in this Article 
is updated through January 1, 2009. 
1 Terrence Guay, Local Government and Global Politics: The Implications of 
Massachusetts’ “Burma Law,” 115 POLI. SCI. Q. 353, 365 (2000) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting interview with Byron Rushing). 
2 The word “divestment” may be used in a variety of ways.  In this Article, 
the word “divestment” is used to describe investment-related actions motivated 
principally by concern for noneconomic objectives, in this case mainly concern 
about the atrocities in Darfur.  “Divestment” in this sense can involve both buy-
side actions (i.e., refusing to buy new or additional securities in a target company) 
and sell-side actions (i.e., selling securities in a target company, here called 
“disinvestment” to distinguish it from the broader “divestment”).  A divestment 
strategy can include shareholder engagement, perhaps coupled with any or all of 
a refusal to purchase new securities, a threat to disinvest already-owned 
securities, coordination with other concerned shareholders (or other concerned 
persons), and public expression of concerns. 
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atrocities3 in Darfur.  To date, twenty-seven states and the District 
of Columbia,4 as well as twenty-two cities,5 have adopted 
divestment policies regarding Darfur.  This is the most widespread 
divestment movement in the United States since the end of 
apartheid, nearly a generation ago.6  Indeed, concern for Darfur 
has been a “specific-event catalyst” sparking wider interest in 
 
3 A terminological aside is in order to explain my use of the word “atrocities” 
here, as opposed to the more specific word “genocide.”  As discussed infra Section 
2.1, the word “genocide” is potent, both legally and politically, giving rise to 
ongoing debate about whether the atrocities in Darfur fall within the legal 
definition thereof.  Based on my reading about Darfur, I believe that genocide is 
being committed there.  
 Nevertheless, for purposes of this Article, it generally does not matter 
whether the atrocities in Darfur satisfy the legal definition of genocide.  
Regardless of whether the Sudanese Government and Janjaweed have the 
requisite intent to destroy the “African” peoples, they have committed massive 
atrocities in Darfur demanding the world’s condemnation and, more, the world’s 
action to end the atrocities.  See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, ¶¶ 4.19–20 (2001) 
available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf. (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2009) (indicating that the “responsibility to protect” applies to “large scale 
loss of life . . . with genocidal intent or not”); Beth Van Schaack, Darfur and the 
Rhetoric of Genocide, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1101, 1103, 1135–36 (2005) (arguing that 
policy responses to ongoing mass violence should be divorced from questions 
about the legal definition of “genocide”).  In my view, that is sufficient for 
purposes of discussing the divestment movement.  Accordingly, this Article will 
generally use lay terms like “atrocities,” reserving legally-specific terms like 
“genocide” or “crimes against humanity” for use where relevant to particular 
arguments. 
4 Sudan Divestment Task Force, Divestment Statistics, 
http://sudandivestment.org/statistics.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).  The Sudan 
Divestment Task Force also notes that: 
[n] ineteen of these states have passed the Sudan Divestment Task 
Force model of targeted Sudan divestment: Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Vermont.  Eight  of 
these states have developed state specific methods of Sudan divestment: 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey 
and Oregon.   
5 Id. (“Baltimore, MD; Charlottesville, VA; Chicago, IL; Cleveland, OH; 
Denver, CO; Edina, MN; Hopkins, MN; Los Angeles, CA; MetroWest, NJ; Miami 
Beach, FL; Miami Gardens, FL; Minneapolis, MN; New Haven, CT; Newton, MA; 
Palm Beach Gardens, FL; Philadelphia, PA; Pittsburgh, PA; Providence, RI; San 
Francisco, CA; Seattle, WA; St. Paul, MN; . . . and Worcester, MA.”). 
6 By the end of apartheid, “as many as 140 states, counties and localities” had 
divested from South Africa.  Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth 
in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 995 & n.140 (2001). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/4
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divestment and other forms of socially-responsible investing 
(“SRI”).7 
Divestment allows the states8 to express their moral 
condemnation of business activities that significantly benefit the 
Sudanese Government, and to disassociate themselves from 
companies that persist with such activities.  In so doing, 
divestment also places the states in public debate about U.S. policy 
towards Sudan.  For this reason, the Darfur divestment movement 
was born in the shadow of constitutional doctrine intended to 
preserve the foreign-relations prerogatives of the federal 
government. 
Further impetus for the state divestment movement thus comes 
from an intriguing source:  the federal government.9  The Sudan 
Accountability and Divestment Act of December 31, 2007 
(“SADA”), authorizes the states to divest—within important 
bounds—from companies that do business in Sudan.10 
SADA passed over the strong objections of the Bush 
Administration, although ultimately with the signature of 
 
7 See Joel C. Dobris, SRI—Shibboleth or Canard (Socially Responsible Investing, 
That Is), 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 755, 758 & n.12 (2008).  This Article is going to 
publication as the financial crisis reshapes Wall Street in ways that seemed 
unimaginable only months ago.  How will the financial crisis affect SRI?  It may, 
especially in the near term, diminish interest in SRI, as flight from risk trumps 
other considerations for many investors.  It may also affect SRI less directly, for 
example, by reducing interest in equity investing or distracting attention from 
Darfur (or international affairs more generally).  And the Madoff fraud may—
again, especially in the near term—deprive the Elie Wiesel Foundation and other 
human rights champions of resources needed for Darfur advocacy.  See generally, 
Stephanie Strom, Wall Street Fraud Leaves Charities Reeling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/business 
/16charity.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).  On the other hand, President-elect 
Obama may use his “bully pulpit” to focus greater public attention on the plight 
of Darfur.  The financial crisis—and the regulatory responses thereto—may also 
weaken what Joel Dobris had identified as a countertrend to SRI: the “de-
equitization” of the markets—because of the rise of private equity, hedge funds, 
and derivatives with some rights previously confined to equity—reduced 
transparency and made it harder to “name and shame” potential targets.  Dobris, 
supra, at 775–76.  These circumstances remind us, as Yogi Berra is said to have 
said, “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” 
8 In the interests of brevity, this Article will generally include local 
governments within discussion of “states,” except where the specific context 
requires separate mention of local governments. 
9 See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 
21 Stat. 2516 (2007) (authorizing states to divest from companies that conduct 
business operations in Sudan). 
10 Id. § 3(b). 
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President Bush.11  The Administration raised “grave constitutional 
questions” about SADA,12 and effectively challenged Congress to 
answer the question: Why should Congress enable state 
participation in U.S. foreign policy?13 
This Article offers an answer—surely not the only answer—to 
the question “Why?”  While the economic sanctions literature 
typically stresses issues of the effectiveness or expressiveness of 
economic sanctions imposed by the states, this Article places 
principal emphasis on the potential of state divestment, deployed 
wisely, to contribute valuably to the domestic political process for 
the formulation of foreign policy.  That is to say, state divestment 
may call attention to an under-attended concern, influence societal 
attitudes about that concern, and build domestic political support 
for a more vigorous national response thereto.  Congress may 
reasonably conclude that it wishes to hear state speech about 
Darfur as it continually reassesses the degree of priority to afford 
Darfur amongst the many concerns competing for Congressional 
attention. 
Welcoming state participation in the process of foreign policy 
formulation has its costs, to be sure.  It makes that process messier, 
noisier, and (on the margins) less predictable.  It poses 
coordination challenges for the national government, which is 
ultimately responsible for deciding and executing foreign policy.  
Yet these very costs also contribute to the case for SADA, which 
may be conceived as regulating divestment by establishing bounds 
within which divestment is at least encouraged (if not required) to 
operate.  Such a regulatory approach, which may be designed to 
foster the benefits of divestment while constraining excesses from 
 
11 See infra notes 278–86 and accompanying text. 
12 Negative Implications of the President’s Signing Statement on the Sudan 
Accountability and Divestment Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 
110th Cong. 67–72 (2008) [hereinafter Benczkowski Letter] (letter from Brian 
Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, to 
Richard Cheney, President of the U.S. Senate, giving the Dept. of Justice’s views 
on the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act).  
13 See id. at 70 (“State and local governments are already engaging in a wide 
range of divestment activities, most of which have not given rise to preemption 
lawsuits, much less Federal judgments invalidating the State schemes on foreign 
affairs grounds.  The divestment portion of the current bill is necessary only if 
State and local governments want to expand their divestment activity to interfere 
with Federal foreign policy in a way that would merit the Federal intervention the 
bill seeks to prevent.  We do not understand why Congress would want to protect 
such activity.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/4
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harming national interests, offers Congress a superior alternative 
to outright prohibition. 
SADA represents an unprecedented federal endorsement of 
state divestment.  It thus exemplifies a constitutional theory called 
“dialogic federalism,”14 which rejects the traditional doctrine that 
our nation does and must speak with only “one voice” in foreign 
relations, in favor of a more pluralistic vision that both more 
accurately describes the reality of our national political processes 
and more fully accords with our democratic values.15  Dialogic 
federalism recognizes that the federal government has the 
dominant voice in foreign affairs, but it has the option to tolerate, 
encourage, and even listen to and benefit from other speakers.  
This recognition allows states to speak on matters of foreign policy 
subject to federal constraints.  SADA illustrates the possibilities of 
both state speech and federal constraints in a federalist dialogue on 
foreign policy.  This Article thus offers SADA as an important new 
case study to the literature on dialogic federalism,16 demonstrating 
 
14 This Article borrows this phrase, with appreciation, from Catherine 
Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human 
Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001).  Robert Ahdieh 
collects a variety of similar terms proposed in the federalism literature.  See Robert 
B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from 
Coordination 30 (Emory University School of Law and Economics Research Paper 
Series No. 08-30), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1272967 (last visited Feb. 
22, 2009).  I use “dialogic” here as best capturing the vertical, horizontal, and 
transnational conversations that state divestment is capable of furthering, while 
also offering a nice antidote to the flawed “one voice” metaphor.  Cf. Powell, 
supra, at 250 n.20 (“I prefer the phrase ‘dialogic federalism’ . . . to stress the central 
importance of dialogue in implementing international norms . . . .”). 
15 On the virtues of pluralism, see generally Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal 
Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007) (arguing for a pluralist approach to 
managing hybridity among communities as an alternative to both territorialism 
and universalism). 
16 Other scholars are also starting to discuss the import of SADA.  Judith 
Resnik discusses SADA among other examples of what she describes as the 
changing landscape of horizontal federalism, as states coordinate more deeply on 
more issues through a variety of semi-official organizations (e.g., the National 
Governors’ Association).  See Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking 
Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal 
Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 34 (2007).  Similarly, in a draft of a forthcoming 
article, Robert Ahdieh situates SADA and the Supreme Court’s decision last term 
in Medellín II (discussed infra Section 4.1) within the post-1995 “federalism 
revolution” in the Court’s jurisprudence, discussing them as examples of what he 
describes as a trend towards expanding into the international realm the ongoing 
devolution of authority from the federal government to the states, thereby 
necessitating voluntary coordination in place of top-down mandates.  Ahdieh, 
supra note 14, at 8-13. 
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the potential of political bounding to reconcile remarkable federal 
openness to state input on foreign policy with the preservation of 
ultimate federal control over foreign policy.17 
Section 2 of this Article situates the Darfur divestment 
movement in political, economic, and historical context.  Section 3 
explores justifications for state divestment based upon its value as 
an instrument of economic pressure, democratic process, and self-
expression.  Section 4 discusses prevailing constitutional doctrine 
governing state actions affecting foreign policy.  Section 5 
examines how SADA dispels doctrinal clouds over state 
divestment, offering instead a new model of federalist dialogue 
about U.S. policy towards Sudan within a bounded space 
established by Congress.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. DIVESTMENT IN CONTEXT 
2.1 The Impetus for Divestment 
2.1.1 The Horrors of Darfur 
Sudan’s postcolonial history is marked by bloodshed.18  The 
Government of Sudan responded to a rebellion in the Western 
Sudanese region of Darfur, which started in 2003,19 with atrocities 
against civilian populations.  The atrocities include murder, rape, 
and burning villages. 20  The atrocities have been committed mainly 
by Government forces and the Janjaweed (“Arab” militias),21 mainly 
targeting the Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa (“African”) peoples. 
 
17 With its emphasis on SADA’s dialogic virtues, this Article leaves for 
another day a fuller consideration of more contentious possibilities, such as the 
extent to which states may divest in the face of Congressional silence or even 
Congressional prohibition. 
18 See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CRISIS GUIDE: DARFUR, chap. II at 1956, 
1983, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13129/ (noting that “[a]part from an 
eleven-year period from 1972 to 1983, Sudan has been at war continuously since 
independence” from British-Egyptian joint rule in 1956) (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
19 Id. at 2003. 
20 See, e.g., Oliver Bercault, Photo Essay: The Crisis in Darfur, 31 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 859 (2008); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR 2007: CHAOS BY DESIGN (2007) 
(describing the atrocities in Darfur), http://hrw.org/reports/2007/sudan0907/ 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
21 Janjaweed is “a derogatory term that normally designates ‘a man (a devil) 
with a gun on a horse.’  However, in this case the term Janjaweed clearly refers to 
‘militias of Arab tribes on horseback or on camelback.’” International Commission 
of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations Secretary-General, ¶511, (Jan. 25, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/4
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Debate about whether these atrocities constitute genocide 
centers on the specific intent requirement set forth in the Genocide 
Convention, namely whether the perpetrators have the “intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such.”22  In 2005, a U.N. Commission of Inquiry found 
“massive atrocities were perpetrated [in Darfur] on a very large 
scale,” but it concluded that the evidence did not show that the 
atrocities were committed with the necessary “intent to destroy” 
the “African” peoples, finding that they were committed instead 
“primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.”23  By 
 
2005) [hereinafter U.N. Commission of Inquiry Report], available at 
http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 
2009). 
22 The Genocide Convention defines the term “genocide” as: 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing 
members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. 
Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, Dec. 9, 1948, art. II [hereinafter Genocide 
Convention]. 
23 See U.N. Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 21, ¶513–22.  In these 
circumstances, the Commission concludes that “crimes against humanity and war 
crimes . . . have been committed in Darfur,” stressing that these crimes “may be 
no less serious and heinous than genocide.”  Id. at 4.  It also notes the possibility 
that some individuals may personally have the requisite intent for genocide.  Id. 
¶520. 
 David Luban criticizes the Commission for relying on the legal definition of 
genocide without regard to its broader lay meaning: 
Organized extermination of civilian populations regardless of specific 
intent is, under current legal definitions, a “crime against humanity.”  
But it isn’t genocide. 
. . . . In everyday speech, we think of genocide as deliberate annihilation 
of masses of civilians, regardless of the specific intention.  That means 
that for non-lawyers . . . the crime against humanity of exterminating 
civilian populations is genocide. Hence, when the UN Commission 
denied that Darfur was genocide, non-specialists could only conclude 
that there was no wholesale extermination going on in Darfur. That is 
not what the UN Commission found, and it is not what it said. But as the 
headlines indicate, it obviously is what people thought the Commission 
had found and said. The legal and moral meanings of the word 
“genocide” have parted ways. As a result, lawyers and journalists talk 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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contrast, in 2008, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court formally requested a warrant to arrest Omar Hassan Ahmed 
Al Bashir, the President of Sudan, to stand trial for genocide 
against the Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa, as well as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.24  The Prosecutor’s view that the horrors 
in Darfur constitute genocide is shared by the Bush 
Administration,25 President-elect Obama,26 and Congress,27 and 
nearly so by the Parliament of the European Union.28 
 
past each other, and politicians suddenly find a convenient linguistic 
excuse for doing nothing. 
David Luban, Calling Genocide by its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the 
UN Report, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 308–09 (2006) (advocating revising the legal 
definition of “genocide” to include “the crime against humanity of 
extermination,” to better align the definition with “public imagination” and 
“moral reality”). 
24 INT’L CRIM. CT., PROSECUTOR’S APPLICATION FOR WARRANT OF ARREST UNDER 
ARTICLE 58 AGAINST OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR 1, available at 
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/64FA6B33-05C3-4E9C-A672-
3FA2B58CB2C9/277758/ICCOTPSummary20081704ENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 
2009). 
25 See Colin Powell, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (Sept. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Powell Testimony] (“When we reviewed 
the evidence compiled by our team . . . we concluded . . . that genocide has been 
committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear 
responsibility—and that genocide may still be occurring.”), available at 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2009); George W. Bush, Speech to the U.N. General Assembly 
(Sept. 21, 2004), 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2075, 2077 (Sept. 27, 2004) (“the 
world is witnessing . . . horrible crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my 
government has concluded are genocide”); George W. Bush, Speech at the 
Holocaust Museum (Apr. 18, 2007), 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 458 (Apr. 23, 
2007) (“No one who sees these pictures can doubt that genocide is the only word 
for what is happening in Darfur—and that we have a moral obligation to stop 
it.”). 
26 For example, then-Senator Obama’s campaign website stated, “Stop the 
Genocide in Darfur: As president, Obama will take immediate steps to end the 
genocide in Darfur by increasing pressure on the Sudanese and pressure the 
government to halt the killing and stop impeding the deployment of a robust 
international force,” available at http://origin.barackobama.com/issues 
/foreign_policy/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). 
 Also notable are the views of Dr. Susan Rice, who will be nominated as U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations: “I swore to myself that if I ever faced such a 
crisis [as the Rwanda genocide] again, I would come down on the side of dramatic 
action, going down in flames if that was required.”  Peter Baker, Obama’s Choice 
for U.N. is Advocate of Strong Action Against Mass Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, 
at A12 (quoting Rice).  See also SUSAN E. RICE, THE GENOCIDE IN DARFUR: AMERICA 
MUST DO MORE TO FULFILL THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2007), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/1024darfur_rice_Opp08.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/4
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2.1.2. Insufficient Action in the Face of Declared Genocide 
Genocide is a potent word.  Coined by Raphael Lemkin during 
the Holocaust,29 it inevitably evokes the horrors of the Nazis’ 
crimes.  Only four years later, the new U.N. General Assembly 
adopted the Genocide Convention “to liberate mankind from such 
an odious scourge.”30  In other words, the Convention “was 
intended to institutionalize the promise of ‘never again.’”31 
As mentioned in its full name, the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide requires the 
nations of the world to “prevent” genocide and not merely 
“punish” it after the fact.32  A 2007 decision of the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) highlights this duty of prevention: 
 The obligation on each contracting State to prevent 
genocide is both normative and compelling.  It is not 
merged in the duty to punish, nor can it be regarded as 
simply a component of that duty.  It has its own scope. . . .  
Even if and when [United Nations] organs have been called 
upon [to act to prevent the genocide], this does not mean 
that the States parties to the Convention are relieved of the 
obligation to take such action as they can to prevent 
genocide from occurring. . . . 
. . . . 
 
27  Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-344, § 4(1) (Oct. 
13, 2006) (describing “the genocide unfolding in the Darfur region of Sudan”); see 
H.R. Con. Res. 467, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Con. Res., 108th Cong., 120 Stat. 1869 
(2004). 
28 European Parliament resolution on the Darfur region in the Sudan, ¶ 16 
(2004), (“crimes against humanity, war crimes and human rights violations, which 
can be construed as tantamount to genocide”), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef-=//EP//TEXT+TA 
+P6-TA-2004-0012+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN (last visited Feb. 22, 
2009). 
29 See, e.g., Josef Kunz, Editorial Comment: The United Nations Convention on 
Genocide, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 738, 738 n.3 (1949) (citing RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN 
OCCUPIED EUROPE, ch. IX: Genocide (1944)); SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM 
HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 40–45 (2003) (discussing Lemkin’s 
efforts to coin and promote the word “genocide”). 
30 Genocide Convention, supra note 22, pmbl. 
31 Scott Straus, Darfur and the Genocide Debate, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 
123, 132. 
32 Genocide Convention, supra note 22, art. I. 
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 [T]he obligation of States parties is rather to employ all 
means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent 
genocide so far as possible.  A State does not incur 
responsibility simply because the desired result is not 
achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State 
manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide 
which were within its power, and which might have 
contributed to preventing the genocide.33 
In short, the very word genocide is a call to action. 
Given the power of this word, the nations of the world 
assiduously (and perhaps not surprisingly) avoided using it to 
describe ongoing slaughter.  Notably, the Clinton Administration 
failed to describe the Rwandan genocide as genocide while it 
happened.34  Even if one discounts the duty of prevention in the 
Genocide Convention,35 as seemed reasonable before the ICJ’s 
robust construction in 2007, the word “genocide” still has 
unmatched rhetorical power in the public imagination.  David 
Luban writes: 
 Lemkin understood that without a memorable word he 
could never draw the world’s attention to the uncanny 
crime that was his life’s obsession.  His ear for linguistics 
was impeccable. . . .  Lemkin’s word eventually conquered 
the world.  It became one of the most powerful in any 
language, and it reshaped the moral landscape of the 
world—arguably, more so than any other single linguistic 
innovation in history.  In doing so, it also reshaped our 
 
33 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment, 
2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶¶ 427–30 (Feb. 26 2007), available at http://www.icjcij.org 
/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).  It ought be noted that the 
Court gives a robust construction to treaty language that had previously been 
disparaged for its weakness. 
34 In his apology to Rwandans in 1998, President Clinton acknowledged that 
“the international community . . . must bear its share of responsibility for this 
tragedy,” because inter alia, “[w]e did not immediately call these crimes by their 
rightful name: genocide.”  William Clinton, Address at Kigali Airport, Rwanda 
(Mar. 25, 1998), reprinted in JARED COHEN, ONE-HUNDRED DAYS OF SILENCE: 
AMERICA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE, app. F at 207, 208 (2007). 
35 See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 3, at 1137–39 (criticizing the Convention’s 
prevention provisions as “frustratingly indeterminate,” “irresolute,” and 
“anemic”). 
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consciousness and, to some extent, it reshaped our culture 
as well.36 
It was therefore an historic event when then-Secretary of State 
Colin Powell declared on September 9, 2004: “the evidence 
leads . . . the United States to the conclusion that genocide has 
occurred and may still be occurring in Darfur.”37  This was the first 
time the United States invoked the Genocide Convention to govern 
an ongoing tragedy.38  Secretary Powell reminded Sudan of its 
obligations “to prevent and to punish genocide” and called upon 
the United Nations to act under the Genocide Convention.39 
Yet, Secretary Powell did not announce any significant new 
U.S. policy initiatives to stop the genocide.  Worse, he suggested 
that none was needed: “[N]o new action is dictated by this 
determination.  We [the United States] have been doing everything 
we can to get the Sudanese Government to act responsibly.”40  The 
context of this quotation indicates that Secretary Powell wanted 
others in the international community to act more vigorously to 
stop the genocide, even if those other nations were not prepared to 
use the word.41  But the Bush Administration failed, at this key 
moment, to commit itself publicly to further action in Darfur.42 
A few months later, Scott Straus observed the post-
determination inaction in Foreign Affairs: 
 
36 Luban, supra note 23, at 307. 
37 Powell Testimony, supra note 25. 
38 See, e.g., Steven R. Weisman, Powell Says Rapes and Killings in Sudan Are 
Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A3 (noting that this is the first time that any 
nation had called for the U.N. to take action under the Genocide Convention). 
39 Powell Testimony, supra note 25; see also Genocide Convention, supra note 
21, art. VIII (“Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the 
United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as 
they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide 
. . . .”). 
40 Powell Testimony, supra note 25. 
41 Id. (“So let us not be too preoccupied with this designation.  These people 
are in desperate need and we must help them.  Call it civil war; call it ethnic 
cleansing; call it genocide; call it ‘none of the above.’  The reality is the same.  
There are people in Darfur who desperately need the help of the international 
community.”). 
42 Cf. Power, supra note 29, at xxi (“No U.S. president has ever made genocide 
prevention a priority, and no U.S. president has ever made genocide prevention a 
priority, and no U.S. president has ever suffered politically for his indifference to 
its occurrence.  It is thus no coincidence that genocide rages on.”) (writing in 
2003). 
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 So far, the immediate consequences of the U.S. genocide 
determination have been minimal, and . . . the international 
community has barely budged.  Nor has the United States 
itself done much to stop the violence. . . .  In the past, 
governments avoided involvement in a crisis by 
scrupulously eschewing the word ‘genocide.’  Sudan—at 
least so far—shows that the definitional dance may not 
have mattered.43 
Straus aptly limits his conclusion with the words “so far,” and 
that was indeed only the start.  The Bush Administration used an 
evocative, loaded word and then fell short of the promise that 
word embodies:  never again.  This combination of an historic (if 
implicit) call to action with a failure to commit publicly to such 
action provides both impetus for public demands for further action 
on Darfur and a politically-salient tool to pursue these demands.44 
This may be seen as the domestic political context for the 
Darfur divestment movement.45  Indeed, Illinois enacted the first 
Sudan-specific divestment law just nine months later.46 
2.2. Divestment in Economic Context 
In 1993, the Clinton Administration designated Sudan as a 
“state sponsor of terrorism.”47  In 1997, citing terrorism and other 
 
43 Straus, supra note 31, at 131–32. 
44 Straus notes similarly that “[t]he term [genocide] grabs attention, and in 
this case allowed pundits and advocates to move Sudan to the center of the public 
and international agendas,” id. at 131, although he appears to refer to use of the 
word by “pundits and advocates” before the Bush Administration’s 
determination and not to their continued use of it thereafter. 
45 I offer this narrative less as history than as reflection.  In other words, it 
does not describe the actual motives driving key activists and legislators, which I 
have not researched, but instead provides context that I personally deem relevant 
to understanding the Darfur divestment movement.  In calling attention to the 
power of the word genocide, however, I do not disagree with Secretary Powell’s 
conclusion that the facts on the ground in Darfur demand world attention 
regardless of whether they satisfy the legal definition of genocide.  See supra note 3 
(arguing that the horrors of Darfur demand world condemnation regardless 
whether they fall within the legal definition of genocide); see also supra note 23 
(noting other crimes may be no less heinous than genocide). 
46 The Illinois Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan, which 
provided for divestment among other measures directed against companies doing 
business with Sudan, was signed into law on June 25, 2005.  See Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733 (N.D. Ill. 2007), 
discussed further infra Sections 4.1, 5. 
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concerns, President Clinton imposed economic sanctions against 
Sudan, broadly prohibiting U.S. persons from trading with Sudan 
and performing contracts in support of projects there.48  In 1998, 
shortly after Al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and 
Dar es Salaam, President Clinton ordered an air strike against a 
Sudanese pharmaceutical plant believed to be manufacturing 
chemical weapons.49  In 2006, citing Darfur, President Bush 
expanded the U.S. sanctions against Sudan.50 
In short: the United States has had little direct business 
dealings with Sudan.51  Other nations have not imposed similar 
sanctions against Sudan.52  Moreover, within limits, U.S. persons 
may invest in foreign companies that deal with Sudan.53  This is 
 
47 See Determination Sudan, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,523 (Oct. 8, 1993) (announcing 
the Secretary of State’s determination that Sudan “has repeatedly provided 
support for acts of international terrorism”). 
48 See Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions 
with Sudan, Exec. Order No. 13,067, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,989 (Nov. 3, 1997) (imposing 
economic sanctions against Sudan); see also 31 C.F.R. Part 538 (setting forth the 
Sudanese sanctions regulations). 
49 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 161–66 (1999) (discussing the U.S. missile 
attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan). 
50 See Exec. Order No. 13,400, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,483 (Apr. 26, 2006) (blocking the 
property of certain persons responsible for the violence in Darfur); Exec. Order 
No. 13,412, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,369 (Oct. 26, 2006) (revising the economic sanctions 
imposed against Sudan pursuant to Exec. Order No. 13,067, supra note 48). 
51  Dealings with Sudan by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, while 
lawful, were nevertheless constrained by legal and public pressures.  See, e.g., 31 
C.F.R. § 538.315 (omitting foreign subsidiaries from the definition of “U.S. person” 
subject to U.S. sanctions); §§ 538.206, 538.407 (prohibiting U.S. persons from 
“facilitating” third-country trade with Sudan); see also Vivienne Walt, U.S. Oil 
Firm Pulls Out of Sudan, FORTUNE (Sept. 14, 2007) (reporting that, after publicity of 
a foreign subsidiary’s dealings in Sudan led to Weatherford’s designation as a 
“highest offender,” Weatherford announced its intent to leave Sudan within 
twelve months), available at http://money.cnn.com/2007/09/12/magazines 
/fortune/walt_khartoumfolo.fortune/index.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2009); 
Sudan Divestment Task Force, Changes Since the Last Sudan Company Report 
(Feb. 29, 2008) (removing Weatherford International Limited, a U.S. company, 
from the list of “ongoing engagement”), available at http://sudandivestment.org 
/company_report_changes.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
52  Among the companies doing the most notable business in Sudan, mainly 
in the oil and power sectors, are ABB, China National Petroleum Corporation (the 
parent of PetroChina), Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Petronas, and Sinopec.  
See SUDAN DIVESTMENT TASK FORCE, SUDAN COMPANY RANKINGS (2008), available at 
http://www.sudandivestment.org/docs/sudan_company_rankings.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2009) (listing companies doing business in Sudan). 
53  The U.S. Department of the Treasury has taken the position that its 
regulations “do not prohibit U.S. persons from making investments in non-
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half of the economic context for divestment from Sudan:  U.S. 
persons are investing in “third country” companies that do 
business in Sudan that U.S. persons cannot lawfully do themselves. 
The other half of the economic equation is the sheer volume of 
assets in state-controlled pension funds.  The largest state pension 
fund, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(“CalPERS”) alone has $183.3 billion in assets under management 
(“AUM”) as of December 31, 2008.54  This excludes the $161.5 
billion in AUM held by the California State Teachers’ Retirement 
System (“CalSTRS”) as of June 30, 2008.55  California to be sure has 
the largest pension funds, but smaller states nevertheless have not-
insignificant AUM:  Connecticut, for example, had AUM of $25.9 
billion in its combined pension and trust funds as of June 30, 
2008.56  Even though the portfolios are widely diversified, they are 
large enough to have sizable stakes in individual companies.  For 
example, CalPERS estimated that California’s Iran divestment law 
would require it to sell $2 billion in shares in just ten companies.57 
2.3. Divestment in Historical Context 
This section briefly introduces the Darfur divestment 
movement and the two modern political precedents most relevant 
to it, and then situates this movement within the larger context of 
state speech on foreign policy. 
 
Sudanese third country companies doing business in Sudan . . ., provided that 
such companies are not owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan or 
predominantly dedicated to or derive the predominant portion of their revenues 
from investments, projects, or other economic activities in Sudan.”  Letter from 
Linda Robertson, Assistant Secretary (Legislative Affairs), U.S. Department of the 
Treasury to Rep. Frank Wolf, at 1–2 (Dec. 13, 1999) (on file with author). 
54 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS., FACTS AT A GLANCE: INVESTMENT (2009), 
available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/investments/reports 
/home.xml (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
55 See CAL. STATE TEACHERS’ RET. SYS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL 
REPORT 23 (2008), available at http://www.calstrs.com/Help/forms_publications 
/printed/CurrentCAFR/CAFRall.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
56 See Office of the State Treasurer, Pension Fund Management Division, 
http://www.state.ct.us/ott/aboutpension.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
57  See ASSEMBLY COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE REPORT FOR 2007 
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 221, Comm. Rep. CA A.B. 221 (2007) (noting 
CalPERS’s estimate). 
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2.3.1. The Darfur Divestment Movement 
As mentioned, twenty-seven states have divested from Sudan.  
Nineteen of the divesting states have adopted the “targeted” 
approach to divestment based on model divestment legislation 
proposed by the Sudan Divestment Task Force.58 
The Task Force’s model legislation provides for:  “best efforts” 
to identify “Scrutinized Companies”59 as targets for shareholder 
engagement and possible disinvestment;60 quarterly updates of the 
list of “Scrutinized Companies;”61 written notice to each 
Scrutinized Company, offering the company “the opportunity to 
clarify its Sudan-related activities” and urging the company to 
cease its “Scrutinized Business Operations” within ninety days;62 
an immediate prohibition against making new investments in the 
Scrutinized Company;63 and disinvestment to begin if shareholder 
engagement does not succeed within ninety days, resulting in the 
sale of at least half the shares within nine months and all the shares 
within fifteen months.64  The model legislation has several 
provisions aimed at minimizing conflict with U.S. foreign policy, 
including: exceptions from the definition of “Scrutinized 
Companies”;65 an exemption for any company “which the United 
States Government affirmatively declares to be excluded from its 
present or any future federal sanctions regime relating to Sudan”;66 
 
58 See Sudan Divestment Task Force, supra note 4 and accompanying text 
(listing states that have divested from Sudan). 
59 See SUDAN DIVESTMENT TASK FORCE, TARGETED SUDAN DIVESTMENT: MODEL 
LEGISLATION §§ 2(d), 2(o) (2008), http://www.sudandivestment.org/docs/task 
_force_targeted_divestment_model.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) [hereinafter 
MODEL LAW] (defining “Scrutinized Companies” as those with certain operations 
in Sudan in the mining, oil, and power industries, certain sellers of military 
equipment to Sudan, and any company that is “complicit in the Darfur 
genocide”).   
60 Id. § 3(a).  See also supra note 2 (defining “divestment” and 
“disinvestment”). 
61 MODEL LAW, supra note 59, § 3(c). 
62 Id. § 4(a)(3). 
63 Id. § 4(c). 
64 Id. § 4(b). 
65 Id. § 2(o) (omitting certain oil and mining companies assisting the regional 
government of Southern Sudan, certain power companies benefiting 
“Marginalized Populations of Sudan,” certain arms companies selling only to the 
regional government of Southern Sudan or international peacekeeping or 
humanitarian groups, and any “Social Development Company” that is not itself 
“complicit in the Darfur genocide”). 
66 Id. § 4(d). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
 
838 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:3 
and automatic termination of the divestment legislation upon 
certain conditions intended to stop divestment at such time as it 
should become either unnecessary due to changes in Darfur or 
contrary to formally-expressed policy of the United States.67 
The Task Force also studies “over 800 companies with 
connections to Sudan” in order to recommend targets for 
engagement or disinvestment.68  Based on this research, the Task 
Force publishes recommendations, updated at least quarterly, of 
companies to target for engagement or disinvestment.  The Task 
Force only recommends disinvestment from relatively few 
targets—twent-three companies at the moment—called the 
“Highest Offenders.”69  These are companies that are not 
responsive to shareholder efforts at engagement and that have 
both a significant on-the-ground presence in Sudan (mainly in the 
oil and power sectors) and publicly-traded equity or debt.70 
The Task Force model seems designed to minimize concerns 
under both the Constitution and general principles of 
pension/trust law (e.g., the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty to the 
beneficiary).71  Although the latter is beyond the scope of this 
Article, it should be noted briefly that the small number of targets 
limits the impact on diversification of the investment portfolio and 
reduces transaction costs.  On the other hand, the Task Force 
approach heightens administrative costs by eschewing use of 
“relatively mechanical, easy-to-apply criteria for identifying 
forbidden stocks (for example, $X assets in [the target country])”72 
in favor of case-by-case judgments following research and 
shareholder engagement.  As these costs are borne in the public 
interest, it is appropriate to find ways to transfer them from 
pension-fund beneficiaries to the public as a whole. 73 
 
67 Id. § 6. 
68 SUDAN DIVESTMENT TASK FORCE, SUDAN COMPANY RANKINGS, supra note 52, 
at 2. 
69 Id. at 5–10. 
70 Id. 
71 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (2007); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, 
SUSAN S. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW (4th ed. 
2006) (providing an overview of pension law). 
72 John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of 
Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 106 (1980). 
73 Dobris, supra note 7, at 761 n.27 (“Computer time could be donated.  SRI 
law students and MBA students could take up tasks, and SRI could be improved 
the way Linux is or a Wiki is.”); id. at 785–86 (“Found and fund something one 
might call ‘The SRI Fund for the Future’ that might make distributions to entities 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/4
 
2009]     DARFUR, DIVESTMENT, AND DIALOGUE 839 
2.3.2. The Anti-Apartheid Divestment Movement 
Unlike Sudan today, until very late in the apartheid era, U.S. 
companies could legally trade with and invest in South Africa; 
indeed, one might say that the point of the divestment movement 
was to pressure the federal government to impose on South Africa 
economic sanctions of the sort that were ultimately enacted in the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (“CAAA”) of 1986.74  This 
meant that many of the largest companies in the United States 
were potential targets for divestment.  Baltimore, for example, 
divested from 120 companies in the S&P 500, representing 40% of 
the total market capitalization of the S&P index at that time.75  
Massachusetts divested from all companies doing any business in 
or with South Africa, an approach Roy Schotland colorfully 
denounces as “blunderbuss divestment . . . . good only for 
masochists and soap-box simplifiers.”76  Other jurisdictions tied 
their divestment approaches to the dollar value or nature of the 
company’s dealings with or in South Africa, or to its compliance 
with the Sullivan Principles77 or other conditions intended to help 
 
that incur excess transaction costs in pursuit of SRI justice.  Alternatively, find 
funding for research into an SRI method that yields risk and gross return figures 
equivalent to a non-SRI portfolio, and then work on getting the transaction costs 
down, or . . . move the transaction costs over to a nonprofit or low profit entity.”). 
74  Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–440, 100 Stat. 
1086 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5116 (1986)) (repealed 1993). 
75 See Bd. of Tr. of Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 
720, 726 (1989) [hereinafter Baltimore Board of Trustees] (discussing the impact of 
Baltimore’s divestment on the volatility of its pension system’s investment 
portfolio). 
76 Roy A. Schotland, Divergent Investing of Pension Funds and University 
Endowments: Key Points about the Pragmatics, and Two Current Case Studies, in 
DISINVESTMENT: IS IT LEGAL? IS IT MORAL? IS IT PRODUCTIVE?  AN ANALYSIS OF 
POLITICIZING INVESTMENT DECISIONS 31, 48, 59 (John H. Langbein et al. eds., 
National Legal Center for the Public Interest 1985). 
77 Reverend Leon Sullivan was a civil rights leader who became the first 
black director of General Motors.  He developed the Sullivan Principles in 1977 to 
govern the activities in South Africa by GM and other signatory companies.  The 
Sullivan Principles obliged signatories to desegregate their South African work 
forces, provide equal pay to South African employees without regard to race, and 
otherwise work to improve working and living conditions for black South African 
employees.  After the end of apartheid, Reverend Sullivan expanded his 
principles for broader use under the name of the Global Sullivan Principles.  See, 
e.g., Jan Hoffman, Public Lives: A Civil Rights Crusader Takes on the World, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1999, at B2 (interviewing Sullivan); Leon H. Sullivan Foundation, 
Biography of Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org 
/foundation/rev/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
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the black population of South Africa.78  Some jurisdictions added 
measures distinct in nature from divestment, such as New York 
City’s ban on advertising job opportunities in South Africa and 
Illinois’ restrictions on selling Krugerrands.79 
Notwithstanding the duration and expanse of the anti-
apartheid divestment movement, and the fact that some of the 
other anti-apartheid measures were overturned in court, the era 
produced little judicial guidance about the legality of state 
divestment.  The main exception is the decision of the Maryland 
Court of Appeals upholding Baltimore’s divestment ordinances 
against a variety of constitutional and other challenges.80  The 
Reagan Justice Department similarly defended the right of states to 
divest.81  But the Supreme Court later underscored that the 
opinions of the Maryland court and the Justice Department are not 
definitive, leaving the legality of state divestment as an open 
question.82  The Congressional picture is also muddy:  Congress 
debated whether to expressly preempt or “non-preempt” state 
divestment, ultimately deciding to do neither. 83 
 
78 See Schotland, supra note 76, at 48–51 (cataloging seven approaches to 
divestment from South Africa). 
79 See generally N.Y. Times v. City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 41 
N.Y.2d 345 (1977) (holding that advertising employment opportunities located 
within South Africa did not express discrimination within the meaning of the 
New York City antidiscrimination laws); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (1986) (holding unconstitutional an Illinois law restricting 
sales of South African gold coins). 
80 See generally Baltimore Board of Trustees (holding, among other decisions, 
that the “ordinances requiring that [Baltimore’s] pension funds divest their 
holdings in companies doing business in South Africa . . . did not 
unconstitutionally impair obligation of city’s pension contract with pension 
beneficiaries [and that] ordinances were not preempted by the Comprehensive 
Anti- Apartheid Act”). 
81 See generally Constitutionality of South African Divestment Statutes 
Enacted by State and Local Governments, 10 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 49 (1986) 
[hereinafter OLC, South African Divestment]. 
82 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387–88 (2000) 
(noting various authorities that thought state divestment from South Africa was 
not preempted and stating that “[s]ince we never ruled on whether state and local 
sanctions against South Africa in the 1980’s were preempted or otherwise invalid, 
arguable parallels between [those and the Massachusetts Burma law] do not tell 
us much about the validity of the latter”). 
83 See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 1001–03 (discussing the legislative history of 
the CAAA). 
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2.3.3. The Burma Sanctions Movement 
In the 1990s, Massachusetts and “[a]t least 18 local 
governments”84 enacted measures intended to promote democracy 
in Burma.  There are two critical points to note.  First, these were 
not divestment measures, but instead “selective-purchase” 
restrictions limiting procurement of goods and services from 
companies doing business with Burma.85  Second, the Supreme 
Court struck down the Massachusetts Burma law in Crosby v. 
National Foreign Trade Council and, as discussed later in this Article, 
the rationales invoked by the Court and lower federal courts 
provide a reference point for organizing discussion about 
constitutional doctrine relevant to state divestment. 
2.3.4. Other State Speech on Foreign Affairs 
The three examples discussed supra are far from the only 
instances where states have spoken on foreign affairs.  Sarah 
Cleveland identifies examples dating back to 1798,86 while 
Matthew Porterfield provides an originalist look at the role of local 
economic boycotts of British goods at the approach of the 
Revolution.87  Porterfield also offers a “taxonomy” of state speech: 
(1) sense-of-the-legislature resolutions, (2) market-participation 
measures (including both divestment and selective-purchase 
rules), and (3) regulatory and tax measures.88  Porterfield’s 
taxonomy might be further refined as (1) sense-of-the legislature 
resolutions and other pure speech, including expressive association 
and disassociation;89 (2) symbolic gestures, more or less akin to 
 
84 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, U.S. S.Ct. No. 99–474, 2000 WL 14805, 
at 20 [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief in Crosby] (describing state and local action 
against Burma). 
85 For a description of the Massachusetts Burma law, see National Foreign 
Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 44–47 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding the law 
unconstitutional). 
86 See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 993 (“Under the Articles of Confederation, 
states enjoyed power to punish offenses against the law of nations, and although 
the Constitution grants this power to Congress, states retain authority to pass 
supplemental legislation.”). 
87 Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free 
Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 25–
31 (1999). 
88 See id. at 3–7. 
89 The Clinton Justice Department identified examples of both permissible 
pure speech (in addition to resolutions) and symbolic disassociation: “A State may 
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pure speech;90 (3) market-participation measures, with some 
differences between divestment and selective-purchase rules; and 
(4) regulatory, tax, and other measures with significant impact on 
private or public interests.91 
Porterfield further draws a line treating pure speech and 
market-participation qua speech as protected from federal 
interference by the First Amendment, while recognizing that 
regulation or tax qua speech might cause constitutional difficulties, 
depending on the details.92  With the endless potential mechanisms 
for state speech, at least some state speech is bound to prove 
objectionable in some respect, so Porterfield is correct that lines 
must be drawn somewhere and that line-drawers should take 
account of the nature and impact of the particular mechanism of 
state speech at issue.93  It is not my purpose here to draw such lines 
among the varieties of speech, as this Article focuses on only one 
type of speech.94 
 
petition Congress and the President to take action against the regime, including 
the imposition of economic sanctions, or to authorize the States themselves to take 
certain action.  A State may decline to send its own officials on trade missions to 
the country so long as the repressive regime remains in power.”  See U.S. Amicus 
Brief in Crosby, supra note 84, at 28.  Other pure speech might include 
gubernatorial speeches, letters (open or private), telephone calls, and meetings 
with dissidents. 
90 Examples of symbolic gestures might include: giving the “key to the city” 
or other honor to a dissident; naming a public place for a dissident (as New York 
City named “Sakharov-Bonner Corner” near the Soviet Mission to the United 
Nations), perhaps accompanied by a statue of the dissident; revoking an honorary 
degree previously given by a state university to a government official (as the 
University of Massachusetts has done to Robert Mugabe); and—in a twist sure to 
warm the academic heart—endowing a chair at a state university in honor of a 
dissident (e.g., the new Aung San Suu Kyi Endowed Chair in Asian Democracy at 
the University of Louisville). 
91 For a litany of state actions, see EARL FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 91–99 (Council on Foreign 
Relations Press 1998). 
92 See Porterfield, supra note 87, at 47 (“Accordingly, selective investment 
laws arguably are entitled to even greater First Amendment protection and thus 
should be even less amenable to federal preemption than selective purchasing 
laws.”). 
93 See Richard Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 821, 829 (1989) (arguing that the variety of state actions should be 
“analyzed and assessed separately”). 
94 Nor is it my purpose to distinguish among the potential targets for 
divestment campaigns apart from Darfur.  Such determinations are best left to the 
democratic process, a process capable of generating particular outcomes with 
which I may disagree.  Compare Resnik, supra note 16, at 89–91 (acknowledging 
“the substance of the policies generated at the local, the translocal, the national, 
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3. THE FUNCTIONS OF DIVESTMENT 
3.1. Divestment as Economic Pressure 
The Sudan Divestment Task Force claims a dozen companies 
have curtailed or improved their practices in Sudan in response to 
the divestment movement.95  This claim seems difficult to verify 
without a detailed case study of each company’s internal decision-
making.  Organizational decision-making often reflects a complex 
mix of motives.  Public statements may (whether purposefully or 
not) overstate or understate the role of divestment—or political or 
moral concerns about Darfur more generally—in the mix.  It is 
known, for example, that Berkshire Hathaway sold its substantial 
interest in PetroChina after divestment advocates urged it to do so, 
but the company’s motivation is debated.96  Other companies may 
 
and the transnational levels do not intrinsically have a particular point of view,” 
listing both liberal and conservative examples), with John H. Langbein, Social 
Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Unprincipled, Futile, and 
Illegal, in DISINVESTMENT: IS IT LEGAL? IS IT MORAL? IS IT PRODUCTIVE?  AN ANALYSIS 
OF POLITICIZING INVESTMENT DECISIONS 9–12 (John H. Langbein et al. eds., National 
Legal Center for the Public Interest 1985) (criticizing social investing campaigns as 
“unprincipled” for focusing on South Africa and Northern Ireland, the latter “for 
the entertainment of the Boston Irish,” but not on Pol Pot’s Cambodia or Idi 
Amin’s Uganda).  Likewise, as Langbein’s example suggests, one might criticize 
state legislatures as being susceptible to capture by powerful local interest groups 
(ethnic or otherwise), resulting in legislation not genuinely reflective of majority 
will, but such a broad critique of democracy in action is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
95 “12  Companies  have ceased operations in Sudan (or formalized and 
publicized a plan to do so) or significantly changed their behavior in the 
country since the proliferation of the Sudan divestment movement.  Several of the 
companies have directly and/or publicly cited the Sudan divestment movement 
as a cause of their actions, while others have mentioned “humanitarian,” 
“political,” and even “moral” concerns related to Sudan.  Those companies 
include: Bauer AG, CHC Helicopter, ICSA of India, La Mancha Resources, 
Petrofac, Rolls Royce, Schlumberger, Siemens, Sumatec, UMW Holdings, 
Weatherford International, and Weir Group.”  Sudan Divestment Task Force, 
Divestment Statistics (2008), http://sudandivestment.org/statistics.asp (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
96 Berkshire Hathaway sold its 11% stake in PetroChina for an 800% profit a 
few months after shareholders overwhelmingly rejected (1.8% to 97.5%) a 
resolution to require divestment.  These facts allow management to maintain that 
the decision was commercial, while divestment advocates declare victory.  
Compare Buffett Sells PetroChina Stake, 54 OIL DAILY, Oct. 22, 2007 (quoting Warren 
Buffett as saying that “we sold based on price.  It was 100% a decision based on 
valuation.”), with Karen Richardson, Buffett’s PetroChina Sale: Fiscal or Social Move? 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2007, at C1 (reporting “‘I think he finally gets it,’ Eric Cohen, 
Chairman of Investors Against Genocide, says about Buffett.”). 
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act for commercial reasons (or largely so), but choose for a variety 
of reasons to publicly attribute their actions to moral or political 
concerns. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that divestment, if supported by 
enough investors, may put pressure on a company’s share price.  
Consider Talisman, a Canadian company, which was accused of 
complicity in the atrocities in Southern Sudan (which are separate 
from the atrocities in Darfur, in Western Sudan) in connection with 
its role in a major oil project in Southern Sudan.97  When Canada 
considered whether to impose economic sanctions that would have 
forced Talisman to leave Sudan, Talisman resisted on the ground 
that “it had already suffered a serious blow in the stock exchanges 
of North America that had resulted in such a significant reduction 
in its share price that it might become a takeover target.”98  
Talisman ultimately sold its investment in Sudan, explaining, “We 
felt the controversy detracted . . . from the strength of our other 
assets.”99  Stephen Kobrin provides numbers supporting 
Talisman’s claim: 
[Talisman’s] shares sold at a 20% premium (to net asset 
value) before the investment [in Sudan], [but] it was priced 
at a 10 to 20% discount during the period Talisman was in 
Sudan.  The share price recovered almost immediately 
upon announcement of the sale, trading very close to its all 
time high in June 2002.100 
Kobrin attributes the depression of Talisman’s share price to 
the general political fallout from its investment in Sudan, saying 
that the impact of divestment cannot be isolated from other Sudan-
related pressures.101  The Talisman example suggests that the 
 
97 See generally Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. 
Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying Talisman’s motion to dismiss); Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(granting Talisman’s motion for summary judgment). 
98 Robert Matthews, Canadian Corporate Responsibility in Sudan: Why Canada 
Backed Down, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT, LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL 
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 244 (John Kirton & Michael 
Trebilcock eds., 2004). 
99 Id. at 246. 
100 Stephen Kobrin, Oil and Politics: Talisman Energy and Sudan, 36 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 425, 426 (2004). 
101 Id. at 444 (“[I]t is clear that the activities of the advocacy groups had a 
significant effect on Talisman’s share price and enterprise value.  While it is 
impossible to disentangle the impact of the risk within Sudan, American 
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economic impact of divestment may be sufficiently robust in at 
least some circumstances as to induce meaningful changes in 
company behavior.102 
More broadly, situating divestment within the larger 
movements for corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) and 
socially-responsible investing (“SRI”), more companies—especially 
large, publicly-traded companies—are devoting more resources 
towards monitoring their compliance with CSR benchmarks.103  
KPMG reports that 79% of the “Global Fortune 250” companies104 
now publish reports about their CSR compliance, up sharply from 
52% reporting in KPMG’s last survey in 2005.105  The same trend is 
seen among the 100 largest companies in the United States, with 
CSR reports jumping from 32% in 2005 to 74% in 2008.106  These 
CSR reports typically employ standard benchmarks to establish the 
 
sanctions, shareholder activism, and the divestment campaign, it is reasonable to 
assume that the impact of the latter has been significant.”). 
102 In this regard, the Genocide Intervention Network (which sponsors the 
Sudan Divestment Task Force) conducted a share value analysis, concluding: 
On average, the “Highest Offenders” in Sudan underperformed their 
peer group average by 45.97% over one year, 22.23% over three years 
and 7.22% over five years.  The one year forecasted return on equity for 
“Highest Offenders” in Sudan (based on analyst consensus estimates) 
was, on average, 6.06% less than the peer group mean . . . . Based on the 
median returns for “Highest Offenders” in Sudan, the “Highest 
Offenders” underperformed their peer group median by 1.09% over one 
year, 16.07% over three years and 3.3% over five years. The one year 
forecasted return on equity for “Highest Offenders” in Sudan (based on 
analyst consensus estimates) was, on average, 2.86% less than the peer 
group mean. 
GENOCIDE INTERVENTION NETWORK, SUDAN PEER PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS (2008), 
http://www.sudandivestment.org/peer_analysis.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
103 See infra text accompanying notes 115 to 126. 
104 That is, the 250 largest companies in the world, measured by revenues, 
according to Fortune Magazine. 
105 KPMG, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 
2008 4, available at http://www.kpmg.com/SiteCollectionDocuments 
/International-corporate-responsibility-survey-2008.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) 
[hereinafter KPMG SURVEY]. 
106 Id. at 16.  In addition to the Global Fortune 250, KPMG also examines CSR 
reporting by the largest 100 companies in each of twenty-two countries (mainly in 
the OECD), finding significantly increased CSR reporting in twelve of the thirteen 
countries that were also studied in 2005 (with a slight increase in the last, 
Denmark).  Id.  Among these 2,200 companies, 45% now publish CSR reports, 
albeit with significant variance from country to country.  Id. at 4.  As one might 
expect, a higher percentage (54%) of listed companies among the 2,200 report on 
CSR than of companies owned in any other manner.  Id. at 23. 
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extent of each company’s CSR performance.  Among the Global 
Fortune 250, a plurality of 40% of the reports107 reference the “ten 
principles” of the U.N. Global Compact,108 which in turn 
incorporate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,109 while 
21% of the reports directly reference the Universal Declaration and 
others reference other benchmarks incorporating human rights 
standards.110 
A divestment strategy entailing shareholder engagement, 
backed by the possibility of disinvestment, may thus help to 
propagate and encourage the internalization of human rights 
norms among multinational businesses.  In this sense, divestment 
may be seen as opening channels for transnational dialogue—
supplementing, not replacing, traditional international dialogue—
about human rights.  This channel of discourse builds upon the 
established and uncontroversial channel of investor-company 
communication, as well as the trend towards greater inclusion of 
human rights discourse in such communication.111  It also has the 
 
107 Id. at 29. 
108 The U.N. Global Compact publishes a statement of principles signed by 
4,700 businesses in 120 countries.  United Nations Global Compact, Participants & 
Stakeholders: U.N. Global Compact Participants, http://www.unglobalcompact.org 
/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).  These 
principles involve a commitment by participating businesses to “support and 
respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and make sure 
that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.”  United Nations Global 
Compact, The Ten Principles of the Global Compact, princs. 1–2, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AbouttheGC/TheTENPrinciples/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
109 See id. pmbl. 
110 KPMG Survey, supra note 105, at 28.  In addition to the U.N. Global 
Compact and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the other benchmarks 
mentioned by KPMG are: the ILO Core Conventions (24%), OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (13%), “Industry specific framework/standards” (12%), 
ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development (3%), and the Global Sullivan 
Principles (2%).  Id.  Any one report could reference more than one benchmark. 
111 As an example of this trend, 52 investors representing about $4.4 trillion in 
assets under management recently wrote a letter to the chief executive officers of 
9000 companies listed on major indices worldwide urging them to join the U.N. 
Global Compact.  Press Release, United Nations Principles for Responsible 
Investment, Global Investors Issue US $4 Trillion Incentive for Sustainability (Oct. 
27, 2008), available at http://www.unpri.org/files/prfinalef2610.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2009).  The 52 signatories represent a subset of the investors, with $15 
trillion in assets under management (before the financial crisis), which have 
signed the U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment.  See Principles for 
Responsible Investment, Signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment, 
http://www.unpri.org/signatories (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (listing signatories 
by category).  The Principles encourage greater consideration of “environmental, 
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advantage of speaking directly with private persons in a position 
to advance (or, at least, to refrain from undermining) human 
rights. 
3.2. Divestment as Democratic Process 
The previous section examined divestment as it is 
conventionally understood, as an instrument of economic pressure 
directed against target companies.  That might be regarded as the 
external aspect of divestment.  This section discusses the internal 
aspect of divestment.112  As stated by Byron Rushing, the chief 
sponsor of the Massachusetts Burma law, the purpose of that law 
was not to conduct foreign policy, but to “influenc[e] the national 
government” as it makes foreign policy decisions.113  In a leading 
article about state measures implicating foreign policy, written at 
the time of the anti-apartheid movement, Richard Bilder concurs: 
 [A]t least some of these activities appear to implicate 
significant freedom of speech and petition values.  Their 
real addressee is not some foreign government but our own 
U.S. policymakers, and their real purpose is not to intrude 
into the conduct of our foreign relations but to influence the 
making of our foreign policy.  To the extent that state and 
local actions express citizen and community views, raise 
public consciousness and add to robust debate on 
 
social, and corporate governance (ESG) issues” by companies and investors.  
United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, The Principles for 
Responsible Investment, http://www.unpri.org/principles (last visited Feb. 12, 
2009). 
112 See Andrea L. McArdle, In Defense of State and Local Government Anti-
Apartheid Measures: Infusing Democratic Values into Foreign Policymaking, 62 TEMP. L. 
REV. 813, 815 (1989) (“These subnational measures, driven by an overarching 
concern to undermine apartheid, have both an internal and external dimension, 
speaking simultaneously to a national and international audience.”). 
113 The full quotation appears supra p. 823 as the epigraph.  See also Powell, 
supra note 14, at 289 n.188 (quoting Rushing as saying that the purpose of the 
Massachusetts Burma law was “to put pressure on the federal government”).  Of 
course the line between conducting foreign policy and influencing the federal 
government’s making of foreign policy may prove less than perfectly straight and 
clear in actuality.  In this regard, Rushing has also acknowledged the “delicate 
process by which foreign diplomatic representatives came to talk directly to him 
on matters relating to the Burma bill. . . .”  Peter Spiro, International Law and the 
Work of Federal and State Legislators: Tracing the Institutional Insinuation of 
International Law, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 50, 51 (2001) (summarizing 
Rushing’s comments). 
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important public policies, they serve an important public 
function.  We should think long and hard, and be sure we 
have very good reasons, before doing anything to restrain 
them.114 
So regarded as an instrument of democratic process, the 
effectiveness of divestment should be measured in terms of its role 
in building domestic political support for a more vigorous national 
response to an underattended foreign concern.  Although genuine 
measurement of these internal effects presents daunting empirical 
challenges, this section highlights anecdotal evidence establishing 
the potential of divestment for meaningful impact on the 
democratic policy-making process.115 
3.2.1.  Attention-getting 
Politicians as a class are skilled at creating media-friendly 
events—including photo-ops with, and testimony by, sympathetic 
witnesses and celebrities—in support of their projects.  When state 
legislatures introduce, consider, and enact divestment legislation, 
 
114 Bilder, supra note 93, at 829; see also McArdle, supra note 112, at 845: 
State and local government measures intended specifically to 
communicate foreign policy positions to the national government 
and influence the direction of that policy, implement the expressive 
and associational interests of the citizenry and should be 
presumptively protected under the first amendment. Absent 
extraordinary circumstances in which such expression would 
seriously jeopardize national security, the constitutional balance 
weighs heavily in favor of permitting such local advocacy. 
115 To make explicit the implicit, this argument about the democratic virtues 
of state divestment is limited to state actions that themselves result from 
democratic processes.  This limitation avoids the criticism leveled by John 
Langbein: 
It is vital to understand that, almost by definition, the causes that are 
grouped under the social-investing banner are those that have failed to win 
assent in the political and legislative process . . . . The reason, therefore, that 
the proponents of social investing are bullying pension trustees is that 
they have been unable to get their political programs accepted in the 
political process. 
John H. Langbein, Social Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: 
Unprincipled, Futile, and Illegal, in DISINVESTMENT: IS IT LEGAL? IS IT MORAL? IS IT 
PRODUCTIVE? AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICIZING INVESTMENT DECISIONS 8 (John H. 
Langbein et al. eds., 1985) (emphasis in original).  More fundamentally, in my 
view, Langbein misconceives state divestment as an alternative to the political 
process rather than as part of it—as shown, for example, by the passage of the 
CAAA the year after Langbein wrote. 
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and when governors sign such legislation, they create 
opportunities for local television and print coverage of the horrors 
of Darfur.116  This coverage may inform more people about Darfur 
and persuade them that more can and should be done to stop the 
barbarity there.  The President may have the “bulliest” “bully 
pulpit,”117 but governors and state legislators also have pulpits 
capable of reaching and persuading (mainly) local audiences. 
Speech by a state may be analogized, rather imperfectly, to 
“collective speech” by the citizens of the state in that it can be said 
that “by collective effort individuals can make their views known, 
when, individually their voices would be faint or lost.”118  In this 
regard, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner) compares municipal 
speech with “a megaphone amplifying [residents’] voices that 
might not otherwise be audible . . . .”119  Indeed, Terrence Guay 
provides anecdotal support, again involving Byron Rushing, for 
the possibility that states may further amplify their speech by 
expressing themselves symbolically rather than via pure-speech 
mechanisms like “sense of the legislature” resolutions: 
 In June 1997, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia J. Stapleton 
Roy visited the Massachusetts State House to meet with 
legislators advocating a bill to impose sanctions on 
Indonesia.  When the ambassador asked why the legislators 
 
116 Even unsuccessful bills may generate local media attention and concern.  
For example, when the Idaho Statesman editorialized critically about a divestment 
bill, it took the opportunity to denounce “the staggering inhumanity” in Darfur.  
See Our View: Would Divesting Really Help End Darfur Tragedy? IDAHO STATESMAN, 
Dec. 20, 2007 (on file with author).  Indeed, virtually all mentions of Darfur I 
found on a search of the STATESMAN’S website (which excludes wire stories printed 
in the newspaper) have a local dimension: an op-ed by a local high school class; 
the state pension fund’s creation of a voluntary “Sudan-free” investment fund; the 
Diocese of Idaho’s divestment from Sudan; local photography exhibits, 
fundraisers, rallies, concerts, and lectures about Darfur; a “tent for hope” erected 
at a local church; and coverage of the divestment bill, which failed in committee 
by a 5-4 vote after “two days of impassioned testimony” in a “packed committee 
room.”  Heath Druzin, Darfur Divestment Bill Dies in Committee, IDAHO STATESMAN, 
Feb. 21, 2008 (on file with author). 
117 While not widely in use today, the word “bully” was an adjective akin to 
“superb” at the time when Theodore Roosevelt coined the famous phrase that 
captures the persuasive powers of the presidency. 
118 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 907–08 (1982) (quoting 
Citizens Against Rent Control Coal. for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 
(1981)). 
119 Creek v. Vill. of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186, 193 (7th Cir. 1996); see also 
Porterfield, supra note 87, at 34–35 (discussing Creek). 
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did not just pass resolutions instead of laws on the subject, 
Representative Rushing responded that, “for years we 
passed resolutions on a lot of international issues and we 
never even once got a letter back from the State 
Department.  That’s why we pass selective purchase bills, 
because that gets your attention.”120 
3.2.2.  Norm-changing 
James Fearon observes that social norms say, in effect, “Good 
people do X.”121 Cass Sunstein notes that social norms tap into 
“wellsprings of shame and pride.”122  They may influence behavior 
within the community, causing individuals to act in conformity 
with the norm so that they may think well of themselves (“self-
conception”), others will think well of them (“reputation”), or 
both.123 
Norms are not fixed across time, of course.  Sunstein describes 
“norm entrepreneurs” as “people interested in changing 
norms . . . .  If successful, they produce . . . norm bandwagons and 
norm cascades.  Norm bandwagons occur when small shifts lead to 
large ones, as people join the ‘bandwagon’; norm cascades occur 
when there are rapid shifts in norms.”124  He notes the power of 
law qua expression, even without meaningful risk of enforcement, 
to change social norms—citing, for example, norms about cleaning 
up after one’s dog.125  He writes:  “[L]aw might attempt to express 
a judgment about the underlying activity in such a way as to alter 
social norms.  If we see norms as a tax on or a subsidy to choice, 
the law might attempt to change a subsidy into a tax, or vice 
versa.”126 
 
120 Guay, supra note 1, at 365–66 (quoting Frank Phillips, State’s Trade 
Sanctions Win Notice, BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 1997). 
121  Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human 
Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 8 (Thomas Risse et. al. eds., 
1999). 
122 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 952 
(1996). 
123 See id. at 916–17 (discussing role of reputation and self-conception in 
choosing among options). 
124 Id. at 909 (emphasis in original). 
125 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2031–32 (1996). 
126 Id. at 2034. 
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In this sense, states divesting from Sudan may be regarded as 
norm entrepreneurs, striving to “tax” business activities that 
support the commission of mass atrocities.  They seek to limit a 
norm along the lines of “good people do not impose social 
constraints on the freedom of business to maximize profits,”127 
with a norm that “good people do not engage in business dealings 
that, directly or indirectly, support mass atrocities.”  These norm 
entrepreneurs seek, to flip Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s phrase, to 
“defin[e] deviancy up”—that is, to make socially unacceptable 
practices that previously had been tolerated.128 
Evidence suggests that norms are shifting in favor of greater 
sensitivity to nexuses between business and human rights.  For 
example, in the case of South Africa, the anti-apartheid movement 
(of which divestment was a key locus) seems to have succeeded 
over time in capturing the attention of the U.S. public and 
convincing it that conducting business with the Botha regime was 
morally unacceptable unless done pursuant to special guidelines 
(e.g., the Sullivan Principles) designed to ensure that the business 
benefited the black population of South Africa.129  This change 
manifested itself in public opinion polls, in the spread of 
divestment among campuses and governments across the country, 
 
127 Cf. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility Of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (arguing that the public interest is 
best served when business focuses exclusively on maximizing profits within the 
confines of the law and denouncing “social responsibility” as a “fundamentally 
subversive doctrine”). 
128 See generally, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, AMERICAN 
SCHOLAR, Winter 1993, at 17 (arguing that American society has been re-defining 
deviancy so as “to permit previously stigmatized behaviors”). 
129 As a rough proxy for the attention of the U.S. public, I searched the 
Vanderbilt Television News Archive for news coverage on the major national 
network news programs.  I searched for the words “divest,” “divestment,” 
“divestiture,” “disinvest,” and “disinvestment” from the start of the Archive in 
1969 to the present.  Of fifty-two national news stories with these words, forty 
addressed South Africa during a few years in the mid-1980s.  By way of 
comparison, one CNN story about Berkshire Hathaway’s 2007 annual meeting 
mentioned the debate whether to divest from PetroChina.  The other eleven 
stories addressed ordinary commercial transactions.  See Vanderbilt Television 
News Archive, http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) 
(archiving television news coverage).  For information about a broader spike in 
network television coverage of South Africa in 1985–86, see Donald R. Culverson, 
The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United States, 1969—1986, 111 
POLI. SCI. Q. 127, 144 fig.1 (1996).  The divestment movement spiked at about the 
same time, as did the New York Times’ coverage of anti-apartheid activities.  See 
Frederic I. Solop, Public Protest and Public Policy: The Anti-Apartheid Movement and 
Political Innovation, 9 POL’Y STUD. REV. 307, 321 fig.8, 310 fig.1. 
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and ultimately in the passage of the CAAA by a Republican-
controlled Senate over President Reagan’s veto.130  More generally, 
divestment is part of the larger CSR movement, which is clearly 
progressing in its effort to persuade businesses to internalize 
human rights norms.  As mentioned, KPMG reports that 79% of 
the “Global Fortune 250” companies now publish reports about 
their CSR compliance, leading KPMG to conclude that “[c]orporate 
responsibility reporting has gone mainstream.”131  Intriguingly, 
52% of the companies publicly identify “employee motivation” as 
their reason for publishing CSR reports,132 suggesting that 
employees of major multinationals tend to accept the social norm 
of CSR.  They take “pride” (or avoid “shame”) in knowing that 
their employer is behaving responsibly or taking steps to move 
towards responsibility. 
3.2.3. Door-opening 
It is a commonplace of federalist theory that state and 
especially local governments are closer to, and more responsive to, 
public concerns than the national government.  Several examples 
suggest that this maxim extends to foreign-relations concerns.  In 
the 1970s, thirteen states prohibited compliance with the Arab 
embargo of Israel before Congress passed the federal “anti-
boycott” laws.133  As many as 140 jurisdictions imposed divestment 
or selective-purchasing rules opposing apartheid before Congress 
enacted the CAAA.134  At least eighteen local governments joined 
 
130  Culverson, supra note 129, at 146 (showing that support in Gallup polls 
for increasing U.S. pressure on South Africa jumped from 47% in 1985 to 55% a 
year later).  Roper Center polls similarly show that opposition to apartheid grew 
from the mid-1970s, becoming overwhelming by the mid-1980s, and that support 
for U.S. sanctions also grew during this time to the point that a majority of the 
public supported the override of President Reagan’s veto of CAAA. 
131 KPMG Survey, supra note 105, at 13–14. 
132 Id. at 10, 18. 
133 See Eric L. Hirschhorn & Howard N. Fenton III, States’ Rights and the 
Antiboycott Provisions of the Export Administration Act, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
517, 522 n.38 (1981) (listing those states that adopted anti-boycott laws).  In 
discussing here the role played by state anti-boycott and selective-purchasing 
laws in securing passage of federal legislation, I note that those laws may raise 
certain constitutional issues distinct from divestment and (as mentioned supra 
notes 92–94) do not engage here with those issues. 
134  See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 995, n.140. 
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Massachusetts in imposing selective-purchasing rules regarding 
Burma before passage of the federal Burma law.135 
State action may focus federal attention on an 
underappreciated issue and facilitate the development of a federal 
response.  It may place an issue on the federal agenda for the first 
time,136 heighten the priority given to the issue by the federal 
government, or build momentum towards a federal response.  The 
movements to prohibit compliance with the Arab embargo of 
Israel, to end apartheid in South Africa, and to promote democracy 
in Burma all resulted in the passage of federal legislation.  The 
Burma example highlights the door-opening potential of state 
action:  advocates initially failed in the Congress, turned to 
Massachusetts “to put pressure on the Federal government,”137 and 
then “leverage[d] their success in Massachusetts into a national 
policy.”138 
Apart from the impact on Congress of the attention-getting and 
norm-changing aspects of state action more generally, it ought not 
be surprising that state action is a particularly effective method of 
generating Congressional action.  State action may motivate the 
Congressional delegation from that state to serve a bridging 
function that brings a matter of state concern before the Congress 
(as when Representatives Jonathan Bingham and Benjamin 
Rosenthal, both of New York, sponsored the main bill that drove 
passage of the federal anti-boycott law).139  State action may also 
facilitate Congressional action by neutralizing opposition among 
the Congressional delegation from that state (as when Senator John 
Kerry of Massachusetts reversed his position on Burma sanctions 
when it became clear that Massachusetts would enact a Burma 
law).140 
 
135  See U.S. Amicus Brief in Crosby, supra note 84, at 20 (describing state and 
local action against Burma). 
136 See generally Solop, supra note 129, at 134–22 (discussing the role of 
divestment in putting economic sanctions against South Africa on the “systemic 
agenda,” “governmental agenda,” and “decision agenda,” culminating in 
enactment of the CAAA). 
137  Powell, supra note 14, at 289 n.188 (quoting Byron Rushing’s description 
of the purpose of the Massachusetts Burma law). 
138  Guay, supra note 1, at 362. 
139  See Henry J. Steiner, Pressures and Principles—The Politics of the Antiboycott 
Legislation, 8 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 529, 531 (1978) (discussing the role of the 
Bingham-Rosenthal bill in the legislative process). 
140  See Guay, supra note 1, at 356, 375. 
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This door-opening function may be seen as an illustration of 
Herbert Wechsler’s “political safeguards of federalism.”  Wechsler 
highlights the critical role of states in “coloring the nature and 
scope of our national legislative processes,” both because of the 
very fact of their existence and their importance “in the selection 
and the composition of the national authority.”141  The power of 
the states in the national government is limited neither to the 
Senate (where it is most plain)142 nor to formal channels of 
influence.143  Wechsler focuses on the negative aspects of state 
power—i.e., the ability of states to block federal action adverse to 
state interests.144  Nevertheless, the same channels of influence 
identified by Wechsler should also afford each state a positive 
power to advance Congressional action on matters of concern to 
it—a point that Wechsler appears to acknowledge.145 
The three examples of door-opening discussed in this section 
should not be taken as comprehensive nor even as representative.  
They are, rather, the “success stories,” where a state initiative 
attracted sufficient horizontal and vertical support to affect—and 
to be seen as affecting—the formulation of federal foreign policy.  
In Crosby, the Clinton Justice Department informed the Court that 
“various state and local governments have adopted or considered 
similar selective-purchasing statutes aimed at other countries, 
 
141  See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543, 546 (1954).  Wechsler’s landmark article has given rise to debate about 
whether the courts should defer to Congressional assertions of power vis-à-vis the 
states on the ground that the states may be deemed to have acquiesced in the 
Congressional action.  See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2001) 
(criticizing the view that “political safeguards are the exclusive means of 
safeguarding the states”).  This debate, however, is not relevant for present 
purposes: it concerns the scope of judicial protection of the states from Congress, 
while this Article concerns Congressional protection of the states from the judiciary.  
See Resnik, supra note 16, at 40 (distinguishing ordinary federalism cases from 
foreign affairs cases concerning the “judicial safeguards of national power”). 
142  See Wechsler, supra note 141, at 546–58 (discussing the role of the states in 
the selection of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the President). 
143  See id. at 547 n.10 (noting that “twenty-eight former governors” served in 
the Senate during the 80th Congress). 
144  See id. at 558 (“[T]he national political process . . . is intrinsically well 
adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of 
the states.”). 
145  See id. at 548 (“[A] latent power of negation has much positive 
significance in garnering the votes for an enactment that might otherwise have 
failed.”). 
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including China, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, 
Morocco, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Switzerland, Tibet, Turkey, and Vietnam.”146  It is presumably the 
case that some of these laws failed to prompt federal action.  State 
action only improves the chances of federal action; it does not 
guarantee such action.  Even where state action fails to elicit a 
federal response, however, it may still contribute to the process of 
foreign-policy formulation.  The first state to act on a matter of 
concern is essentially proposing to the federal government and, 
indeed, other states that they accord high priority to that matter.  
Inaction or even rejection of the proposal in other states can be said 
to represent a national consensus that the matter is not of the 
highest priority.  Such information about democratic preferences 
may be valuable to the President and Congress as they constantly 
reprioritize the infinity of items potentially on the nation’s foreign 
policy agenda. 
3.2.4. Assisting 
States may help formulate foreign policy, for example, by 
supporting a Presidential effort to secure passage of legislation 
empowering the President to pursue foreign policy objectives.147  
 
146  U.S. Amicus Brief in Crosby, supra note 84, at 20. 
147  It appears that the Clinton Administration actively courted state support 
for federal legislation needed to allow China to join the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”), a top priority for the Administration in 2000.  The Annual Report of 
USTR for 2000 states: 
USTR officials participate frequently in meetings of state and local 
government associations to apprise them of relevant trade policy issues 
and solicit their views.  Associations include the National Governors’ 
Association (NGA), Western Governors’ Association (WGA), National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), Council of State Governments 
(CSG), National Association of Counties (NACo), U.S. Conference of 
Mayors (USCM), the National Conference of Black Mayors (NCBM), 
National League of Cities (NLC), and other associations.  In 2000, USTR 
addressed plenary sessions of the NGA, NACo, NCSL, and USCM 
regarding the Administration’s top trade priorities. 
. . . This past year, resolutions endorsing Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations (PNTR) with China in order to open the Chinese market to U.S. 
goods and services were passed by WGA, USCM, CSG, and NCBM.  
Furthermore, 47 governors endorsed the passage of China PNTR. 
OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TITLE 228 (2001), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2001/2001_Tra
de_Policy_Agenda/Section_Index.html (). 
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They may strengthen the President’s negotiating position, for 
example, by highlighting the depth or breadth of public concern or 
by giving the President a chip that may be bargained (through 
preemption, if need be). 
State action may complement federal policy.  An example of 
complementarity is found in the practices of the Office of Global 
Security Risk (“OGSR”) of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”).  The purpose of OGSR is to require issuers 
(i.e., companies issuing securities in the United States), mainly 
foreign issuers, to provide “enhanced disclosure” about their 
activities in countries of foreign policy concern.148  This effort has 
focused on countries designated by the Secretary of State as “state 
sponsors of terrorism,”149 including Sudan.  Ordinarily, the SEC 
 
148  See Perry S. Bechky & Danforth Newcomb, SEC Requires Enhanced 
Disclosure of Dealings with Disfavored Countries, 1 (July 2006), 
http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/7960a3e3-35ea-4699-b975-
086107b9d970/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0423465c-771f-4eb1-8acb-
17f8a02e3327/LIT_073106.pdf; H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003) (advocating 
“enhanced disclosure requirements based on the asymmetric nature of the risk to 
corporate share value and reputation stemming from business interests in these 
higher risk countries”). 
149  The House Committee Report that led to the establishment of OGSR 
expressed concern about “companies with ties to countries that sponsor terrorism 
and countries linked to human rights violations,” specifically naming Sudan.  See 
H.R. REP. NO. 108–221, at 151 (2003).  The emphasis on terror designation came to 
the fore, however, when the Committee described the mission of OGSR in terms 
that thrice mentioned “State Department-designated terrorist-sponsoring states,” 
without further mention of human rights.  Id.  Of course, as in the case of Sudan 
itself, Congress may see meaningful connections between terrorism-sponsorship 
and gross disregard for human rights.  Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2) (2006) (creating 
an exception to sovereign immunity as a defense to certain human rights claims 
brought against designated sponsors of terrorism). 
 The emphasis on terrorism may also be reconciled with another sometimes-
mentioned focus of enhanced disclosure: countries subject to economic sanctions 
implemented by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury.  See, e.g., Letter from Laura S. Unger, then-Acting 
Chair of the SEC, to Rep. Frank P. Wolf, at 3 (May 8, 2001) (on file with author) 
(“The fact that a foreign company is doing material business with a country . . . on 
OFAC’s sanctions list is, in the SEC staff’s view, substantially likely to be 
significant to a reasonable investor’s decision about whether to invest in that 
company.”).  There is overwhelming overlap between countries subject to OFAC 
sanctions and countries designated as sponsors of terrorism.  Countries currently 
designated by the Secretary of State as “state sponsors of terrorism”—the so-
called Terrorist-4 or T-4—are Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria.  See U.S. Department 
of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (listing the countries and their dates of designation).  
All are subject to OFAC sanctions, though Syria less so than the other three.  See 
31 C.F.R. Parts 515 (Cuba), 538 (Sudan), 542 (Syria), 560 (Iran) (2008).  The other 
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requires issuers to disclose information material to a decision by a 
reasonable investor whether to buy, sell, or hold securities.150  The 
SEC maintains that OGSR operates within the framework of the 
traditional materiality standard for disclosure, on the view that 
even dealings with terrorist countries that are not “quantitatively 
material” may be “qualitatively material”151 because they present 
disproportionate risks.152  As evidence of these disproportionate 
 
three countries designated in the recent past—Iraq, Libya, and North Korea—had 
also all been subject to OFAC sanctions.  See 31 C.F.R. Parts 500 (North Korea), 550 
(Libya), 575 (Iraq) (2002).  Burma is the only major recent target of OFAC’s 
country-based sanctions programs not designated as a sponsor of terrorism.  See 
31 C.F.R. Part 537 (2008) (setting out the Burma sanctions regulations).  In any 
event, OGSR practice emphasizes terror more than sanctions: there have been 
instances where OGSR required enhanced disclosure of dealings with terrorist-
designated countries even when such dealings were not prohibited by OFAC.  See 
Bechky & Newcomb, supra note 148, at 1 (describing heightened disclosure 
requirements for dealings with Libya after the Bush Administration suspended 
OFAC sanctions but before it rescinded Libya’s designation as a sponsor of 
terrorism). 
150 See JIM BARTOS, UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 214 
(2006) (“[I]nformation should be considered material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it material in making an 
investment decision or view the relevant facts as having significantly altered the 
total mix of information publicly available.”). 
151 The distinction between “quantitative materiality” and “qualitative 
materiality” is often made by the SEC Staff when requesting issuers to provide 
additional disclosure about business dealings with terrorist-designated countries 
in volumes that are financially immaterial to the issuers.  For example, in 
comments on the 2007 annual report (20-F) filed by Tata Motors Limited, the Staff 
asked for additional information about Tata’s dealings with Iran, Sudan, and 
Syria: 
You should address materiality in quantitative terms, including the 
approximate dollar amounts of any associated revenues, assets, and 
liabilities for the last three years concerning each referenced country. 
Also, address materiality in terms of qualitative factors that a reasonable 
investor would deem important in making an investment decision, 
including the potential impact of corporate activities upon a company’s 
reputation and share value. 
See Tata Motors Limited, Letter to Cecilia Blye, Office of Global Security Risk, at 4 
(May 21, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Tata Response Letter]. 
152 William Donaldson, then-Chairman of the SEC, testified to Congress that 
OGSR “will function within the traditional disclosure mission of the 
Commission,” adding that it “will focus on asymmetric risk” that may arise when 
an issuer has “operations or other exposure with or in areas of the world that may 
subject it and its investors to material risks, trends or uncertainties.”  See 
Statement of William Donaldson, Testimony Concerning Fiscal 2005 
Appropriations Request for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 
31, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts033104whd.htm (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Donaldson Testimony].  Donaldson echoes the view of 
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risks, OGSR regularly references state divestment measures.153  
Thus, state action assists federal policy by enabling the federal 
government to cite the state action in international discourse as 
justification for the federal policy. 
 
the House Committee report that led to the establishment of OGSR.  See H.R. REP. 
NO. 108-221, at 151 (2003) (“[A] company’s association with sponsors of terrorism 
and human rights abuses, no matter how large or small, can have a material adverse 
effect on a public company’s operations, financial condition, earnings, and stock 
prices, all of which can negatively affect the value of an investment.”) (emphasis 
added). 
153 At the outset of OGSR, then-Chairman Donaldson specified that its 
mission would include consideration, inter alia, of “whether a company faces 
public or government opposition, boycotts, litigation, or similar circumstances 
that are reasonably likely to have a material adverse impact on a company’s 
financial condition or results of operations.”  Donaldson Testimony, supra note 
152.  The SEC Staff comments to Tata Motors provide an example in practice: 
We note, for example, that Arizona and Louisiana have adopted 
legislation requiring their state retirement systems to prepare reports 
regarding state pension fund assets invested in, and/or permitting 
divestment of state pension fund assets from, companies that do business 
with countries identified as state sponsors of terrorism. The Missouri 
Investment Trust has established an equity fund for the investment of 
certain state-held monies that screens out stocks of companies that do 
business with U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism. The 
Pennsylvania legislature has adopted a resolution directing its legislative 
Budget and Finance Committee to report annually to the General 
Assembly regarding state funds invested in companies that have ties to 
terrorist-sponsoring countries. States including California, Connecticut, 
Maine, New Jersey, and Oregon have adopted, and other states are 
considering, legislation prohibiting the investment of certain state assets 
in, and/or requiring the divestment of certain state assets from, 
companies that do business with Sudan. A number of states have 
adopted or are considering legislation regarding the investment of 
certain state assets in, and/or requiring the divestment of certain state 
assets from, companies that do business with Iran. Your materiality 
analysis should address the potential impact of the investor sentiment 
evidenced by such actions directed toward companies that have 
operations associated with Iran, Sudan, and Syria. 
Tata Response Letter, supra note 151, at 4.  This may be abbreviated as: “the 
federal government, various state and municipal governments, and numerous 
universities and other institutional investors have proposed or adopted 
divestment or other initiatives regarding investment in companies that do 
business with state sponsors of terrorism.”  See, e.g., Cummins Inc., Letter to 
Cecilia Blye (Aug. 22, 2008) (on file with author).  Intriguingly, when the SEC 
asked Cummins about public reports that its joint venture project in China had 
sold engines for trucks sold to Sudan, Cummins responded by describing its effort 
to stop such sales by its Chinese partner and noting, “Cummins’ actions 
prompted the Sudan Disinvestment Task Force to remove the Company from its 
watch list in August 2007 and to commend Cummins publicly for its response to 
the situation.”  Id. 
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3.2.5.  Final Remarks about Divestment as Democratic Process 
Critics of divestment generally emphasize foreign policy, 
invoking in particular the mantra (discussed infra Section 4) that 
the nation must speak with “one voice” in foreign policy.154  
Proponents, by contrast, often shy away from foreign policy.  
Proponents often focus instead on domestic considerations like the 
right and duty of each state to manage state-controlled assets.155  
Some claim that divestment is warranted under ordinary 
principles of asset management, arguing for example that 
companies with investments in target countries face greater risks 
(including expropriation) or are likely to underperform more 
socially-responsible companies in the longer term.156  These claims 
are not entirely persuasive.157  Nor are they necessary.  States may 
 
154 See, e.g., Benczkowski Letter, supra note 12, at 67–68 (stressing foreign-
relations objections to divestment); Lucien Dhooge, Condemning Khartoum: The 
Illinois Divestment Act and Foreign Relations, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 245, 315 (2006) (same). 
155 For example, the Senate Banking Committee grounds its support for 
SADA on the need of states to manage “risks to profitability, economic well-being, 
and reputations, arising from association with investments in a country subject to 
international sanctions.”  S. REP. NO. 110–213, at 3 (2007). 
156 See, e.g., OLC, South African Divestment, supra note 81, at 62 (stating that 
“[a] state for instance, may decide not to invest in a company doing business in 
South Africa because it believes that there is a large risk of revolution and, thus, of 
expropriation in that country.”). 
157 A 2004 study says: 
A stream of scholarly and applied research has sought to determine 
whether the out-performance argument is borne out in practice. . . .  
Although the literature is inconclusive regarding systematic SRI 
outperformance, it does suggest that actively managed SRI funds do not 
underperform their conventional counterparts. . . . The reason for 
correlations between the performance of conventional and SRI funds 
may be that the portfolios of SRI funds are not markedly different to 
those of conventional mutual funds. 
Matthew Haigh & James Hazelton, Financial Markets: A Tool for Social 
Responsibility?, 52 J. BUS. ETHICS 59, 65 (2004).  In this regard, one would expect 
that a portfolio constructed in accordance with the dominant targeted approach to 
Sudan divestment would not be “markedly different” from a conventional 
portfolio, because the Sudan Divestment Task Force only recommends 
disinvestment from 23 companies.  See Sudan Divestment Task Force, supra note 
52, at 5–10.  By way of rough comparison, a 1980 study found that excluding 
eighteen named companies from the S&P 500 created an uncompensated 1% 
increase in risk.  See STUART A. BALDWIN ET AL., PENSION FUNDS & ETHICAL 
INVESTMENT: A STUDY OF INVESTMENT PRACTICES AND OPPORTUNITIES: STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, 102–03, appx. A (1980).  Langbein and Posner, 
strong critics of SRI, agree that, “[i]f only token exclusions from the portfolio are 
made, the costs in underdiversification are slight,” while stressing that such a 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
 
860 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:3 
properly and openly express views to influence federal 
formulation of foreign policy. 
This pluralistic approach to making foreign policy is noisy, 
even cacophonous, to be sure.  It enables participation in foreign 
policy formulation by a plethora of state officials who have neither 
expertise in foreign policy nor responsibility to execute the 
resulting decisions.  It is, however, democratic.  As a society, we do 
not believe that individuals should be obliged to demonstrate 
foreign policy expertise as a precondition to speaking about 
foreign policy, petitioning Congress about foreign policy, or voting 
on the basis of foreign policy.  Nor should we foreclose those 
individuals from attempting to work through the governments 
closest to them to build support in Congress for their foreign policy 
objectives. 
This endorsement of the democratic virtues of messiness recalls 
the conclusion to Robert Cover’s important article about the 
benefits of having “redundant” federal and state courts: 
 [T]he inner logic of “our federalism” seems to me to 
point more insistently to the social value of institutions in 
conflict with one another.  It is a daring system that permits 
the tensions and conflicts of the social order to be displayed 
in the very jurisdictional structure of its courts.  It is that 
view of federalism that we ought to embrace.158 
It may be an even more “daring system” that permits “tensions 
and conflicts” to be displayed in the domestic formulation of 
foreign policy.159  But it also seems, at least to some extent, to be 
 
limited approach to divestment is “arbitrary,” unprincipled, and incapable of 
producing meaningful “social or moral benefits.”  Langbein & Posner, supra note 
72, at 89; accord Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate 
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 829 & n.118 (1993) (finding that 
even during a period when divestment from South Africa caused some funds to 
underperform, mainly because they excluded many large businesses at a time 
when large businesses outperformed smaller businesses, “there is no perceptible 
effect on fund performance” among funds that limited divestment to companies 
failing to comply with the Sullivan Principles “because the number of firms 
excluded is so small”). 
158 Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, 
and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 682 (1981). 
159 Cover does not address the application of his argument to foreign policy 
formulation, but some scholars have relied on Cover’s ideas in the international 
context.  See Berman, supra note 15, at 1210–18 (applying Cover’s arguments for 
jurisdictional redundancy to several examples in international criminal law); 
Ahdieh, supra note 14, at 41 (applying Cover’s arguments for jurisdictional 
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both inevitable and desirable in an open, robust democracy.  It is to 
be hoped that a forum open to debate among many speakers will 
generate not only noise but also wisdom through competition of 
ideas and priorities.  This is what we expect in domestic policy-
making.  As so many other lines between “the foreign” and “the 
domestic” blur, shift, fade or even vanish in this era of 
globalization, it cannot and should not be expected that this 
particular divide should persist eternally and insuperably.  A 
degree of federal accommodation of state divestment should be 
expected and welcomed. 
To be sure, it is to be hoped that states will demonstrate 
restraint and prudence, taking care both in the choice of subjects 
triggering divestment and in the manner in which divestment is 
implemented.160  Yet, as Cover properly notes, “Unquestionably, 
my perverse perspective may be carried too far.  I, ultimately, do 
not want to deny that there is value in repose and order.”161  
Should questions arise whether the states have “carried too far,” it 
is the job of Congress (with appropriate restraint of its own) to 
determine when to tolerate state divestment, when to encourage it, 
and when to impose “repose and order” upon it.162 
3.3. Divestment as Expression 
Having already considered arguments for state divestment 
based on its potential for economic and political impact, this 
section discusses the extent to which divestment might also be 
justified purely on expressive values—that is, based on the 
inherent value of self-expression wholly apart from any impact 
 
redundancy to advocate a theory of “intersystemic governance” that allows a role 
for states in U.S. foreign policy).  Other scholars have made similar points about 
the value of “debate” or “conflict” in making foreign policy.  See, e.g., Bilder, supra 
note 93, at 829 (stating that “we have never believed that dissent should be stifled 
in the name of efficiency, or that our nation would be better off if government 
policy were free from challenge, discussion and debate.”); Martha F. Davis, 
Upstairs, Downstairs: Subnational Incorporation of International Human Rights Law at 
the End of an Era, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 435 (2008) (stating that “the tension 
between subnational and national policy approaches, while at times 
uncomfortable and destabilizing, also has important benefits.”). 
160 See Bilder, supra note 93, at 831 (arguing that the states must “take 
principal responsibility for ensuring that their activities stay within 
constitutionally permissible and appropriate bounds”). 
161 Cover, supra note 158, at 682. 
162 See discussion infra notes 294–318 and accompanying text (discussing 
SADA as a political standard). 
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that the divestment qua speech might have on target companies or 
the democratic process. 
Divestment is symbolic speech, which is protected and valued 
in our society even when lacking in any political or economic 
impact.  In this regard, one might agree with Alexander 
Meiklejohn that freedom of speech is essential to democracy,163 
without accepting that the needs of the democratic process are the 
only valid justification for free speech.164 
As Douglas Kysar has argued in an analogous context, when 
consumers make decisions whether to buy goods based on 
whether the goods are produced in accordance with methods they 
regard as socially acceptable, they can “project their public views 
and practice their core moral convictions.”165  That is, the consumer 
can “vote[] with one’s dollars” and thereby serve “expressive and 
ethical dimensions” wholly apart from whether the consumer’s 
decision has any “impact on the external world.”166  For example, a 
consumer may legitimately decide to buy only “dolphin-safe” tuna 
as an expression of her opposition to fishing methods that harm 
neighboring dolphin populations, even if she lacks any expectation 
that her action will cause either tuna fleets to change their fishing 
practices or Congress to legislate fishing standards.167  As with 
Kysar’s consumer, so too for an individual investor, who is free to 
express her ethical values by divesting personally from companies 
 
163 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO 
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing that free speech is a necessity of political self-
governance). 
164 As Vincent Blasi notes, the political process justification alone excludes 
“literature or scientific inquiry, an unsettling prospect even for minimalists. . . .”  
Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1999).  
Blasi discusses two other commonly accepted rationales for free speech: human 
dignity/autonomy and “the search for truth.”  Id. at 1568–69.  He argues that 
greater emphasis should be given today to an additional rationale that “plausibly 
can be said to form the spine of each of the renowned defenses of free speech 
produced by John Milton, John Stuart Mill, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Louis 
Brandeis”: the role of speech in developing “good character.”  Id. at 1569. 
165 Douglas Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and 
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 581 (2004). 
166 Id. at 581, 619. 
167 See id. at 540–52 (describing the Tuna/Dolphin case).  In a similar vein, 
Cass Sunstein cites the expressive function served when “a pacifist . . . refuse[s] to 
take a job in a munitions factory, even if the refusal will have no salutary effects.”  
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2027 
(1996). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/4
 
2009]     DARFUR, DIVESTMENT, AND DIALOGUE 863 
active in Sudan without regard to any expectation of “impact on 
the external world.” 
Yet, even accepting the analogy of state speech to collective 
speech by the state’s citizenry, it is troubling to extend Kysar’s 
principle from the individual investor to the state qua investor.  
That would effectively license the state to behave, as individuals 
are free to do, wastefully—that is, without regard to the likely 
benefits and costs of its action.  By stipulation, this section 
addresses circumstances where the speech provides neither 
economic nor political benefits.  And divestment does impose costs 
on a state and its pension-fund beneficiaries; even if diligently 
minimized, these costs will always exceed the costs of sense-of-the-
legislature resolutions, gubernatorial gestures, and the like. 
State speech, therefore, or at least state divestment qua speech, 
might reasonably be limited to speech with important political (per 
Meiklejohn) or economic impact.168  In a similar vein, Sunstein 
cautions against overstating the intrinsic value of expressive 
legislation without due regard to the likely consequences of the 
law:  “good expressivists are consequentialists too.”169 
If, as seems reasonable, state divestment ought to be limited to 
rare circumstances (lest, inter alia, it unduly limit opportunities for 
diversification of an investment portfolio), then divestment is best 
focused on those circumstances where there is a reasonable 
expectation of an “impact on the external world” affecting a matter 
of grave concern.  But that conclusion, it should be said, is directed 
to the good judgment and discretion of the several states; it 
establishes only a rule of prudence, not of law. 
A word should be added here about the extent to which 
associative values affect this discussion of expressive values.  For 
most disinvestment, this distinction collapses because the very 
point of the disassociation is expression.  There may be 
circumstances, however, where a meaningful distinction can be 
drawn.  Consider the views of Derek Bok, the President of Harvard 
 
168 In this regard, scholars who invoke the First Amendment to defend state 
divestment qua speech do so comfortably within the confines of Meiklejohn’s 
approach.  See Porterfield, supra note 87, at 31–35 (arguing that states have First 
Amendment rights under, inter alia, the “modern democratic process view of the 
First Amendment”); McArdle, supra note 112, at 817 (positing that “the self-
government theory underlying the first amendment allows state and local 
government units to be instruments for citizen access to the discourse on national 
policy without jeopardizing the conduct of foreign policy”). 
169 Sunstein, supra note 167, at 2045. 
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University during the anti-apartheid era and again more recently.  
Bok generally opposes disinvestment as contrary to the mission of 
a university endowment,170 but he approves using Harvard’s voice 
and vote as shareholder to influence company conduct on the 
ground that this is part of being a responsible shareholder.171  And, 
if the company refuses to change its practices: 
[t]he University may occasionally sell the stock of a 
corporation because of a disagreement with its policies.  
Such action, however, is not taken to pressure the company 
into conforming with Harvard’s views but occurs because 
the University does not wish to continue an association 
with a firm that fails to live up to minimum ethical 
standards and offers no reasonable prospect of doing so in 
the future.172 
Bok’s approach is prospective, reserving disinvestment for 
circumstances where the company not only failed ethically in the 
past, but “offers no reasonable prospect” for improvements.173  
This approach accords with the ordinary, forward-looking logic of 
investment decisions:  “A portfolio manager will never justify a 
buying decision by referring to the fact that the price of a stock has 
gained.  Always, he will refer to the fact that he expected the stock 
to gain.”174  Bok’s approach is thus genuinely associative, and not 
 
170 See Derek Bok, Statement of Derek Bok on Investment Policy (1984), 
reprinted in JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., DISINVESTMENT: IS IT LEGAL? IS IT MORAL? IS IT 
PRODUCTIVE? AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICIZING INVESTMENT DECISIONS 100–01 (1985) 
(arguing that “the line is crossed when a university goes beyond expressing 
opinions and tries to exert economic pressure . . . in order to press its views on 
outside organizations.”). 
171 See id. at 99.  “We have cast our ballot with care in shareholder resolutions 
concerning South Africa, often voting to urge corporations to subscribe to the 
Sullivan Principles, sometimes voting to have a company withdraw entirely from 
South Africa.  We have engaged in intensive dialog with corporations to persuade 
them to improve wage and employment practices for black South African 
employees and to improve the quality of life outside the workplace for these 
employees, their families, and nonwhites in general.”). 
172 Id. at 101 n.1. 
173 This is also the approach favored by the Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund, a notable practitioner of SRI.  See Jos Leys et al., A Puzzle in SRI: The Investor 
and the Judge, 84 J. BUS. ETHICS 221, 230–32 (2009) (discussing the Norwegian 
decisions to disinvest from Freeport McMoRan, but not from Total, based on 
different assessments about the companies’ likelihood of continuing unacceptable 
behavior). 
174 Id. at 225. 
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expressive, in nature.  It is not different in kind from other 
decisions by an investor to sell shares because of concerns about 
company management. 
Should a state adopt Bok’s approach, the associative values at 
stake can provide an independent justification for disinvestment 
following an unsuccessful effort at engagement, but this 
justification seems likely to remain limited to the rare 
(“occasional”) case. 
4. DIVESTMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 
4.1. The “One Voice” Theory of Foreign Relations 
The dominant view of the role of the states in foreign affairs is 
encapsulated in the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that states 
“do[] not exist” in matters of foreign relations.175  But this 
pronouncement does not describe reality.  The states “exist”:176  the 
federal government is cognizant of states in foreign relations, as are 
other nations and international tribunals;177 694 communities in all 
 
175 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (“[I]n respect of our 
foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.  As to such purposes, the State of 
New York does not exist.”). 
176 See generally Julian Ku, The State of New York Does Exist, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457 
(2004) (arguing that states play an important role in compliance with international 
legal obligations and that this role may “foster more, rather than less, 
development of international law within the United States”). 
177 For example, the parallel WTO cases brought by the European Union and 
Japan against Massachusetts’ Burma law alleged violations of commitments made 
by the United States specifically addressing procurement by Massachusetts.  See 
World Trade Organization Uruguay Round Agreement on Government 
Procurement, Oct. 16, 2002, Appx. I, United States, Annex 2, Sub-Central 
Government Entities which Procure in Accordance with the Provisions of this 
Agreement, WT/Let/431, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e 
/gproc_e/appendices_e.htm#us (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (detailing the U.S. 
commitment with respect to state procurement).  In fact, the United States did not 
require Massachusetts to accept these commitments, but instead invited states to 
participate voluntarily.  See, e.g., Matthew Schaefer, Note on State Involvement in 
Trade Negotiations, the Development of Trade Agreement Implementing Legislation, and 
the Administration of Trade Agreements, in JOHN H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 137–38 (4th ed. 2001).  More generally, the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has a variety of mechanisms dedicated to 
promoting federal-state coordination on trade policy, including the Office of 
Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Liaison, the Intergovernmental Policy 
Advisory Committee, and a network of State Single Points of Contact.  See OFFICE 
OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2007 ANNUAL 
REPORT 232–36 (2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library 
/Reports_Publications/2008/2008_Trade_Policy_Agenda/Section 
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fifty states have “sister city” relationships with 1,749 communities 
in 134 countries, through a program financed in part by federal 
grants,178 thirty-nine states had overseas commercial offices as of 
1994;179 states may act in breach of, or in compliance with, treaties 
and customary norms;180 and, as Louis Henkin shows, “inevitably, 
the states touch foreign affairs even in minding their proper 
business, since foreign nationals live or do business in a state 
pursuant to its laws . . . .”181 
It is often said that our Nation “speaks with one voice” in 
foreign affairs, with the President as its “sole organ.”182  Sarah 
 
_Index.html?ht= (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). (“[The] Office of Intergovernmental 
Affairs and Public Liaison . . . administers the federal trade advisory committee 
system and provides outreach to, and facilitates dialogue with, state and local 
governments . . . .”). 
178 Sister Cities International, Sister Cities International Statistics, 
http://www.sister-cities.org/about/statistics.cfm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).  
Judith Resnik points to the federal funding of the sister city program as an 
example of “cooperative federalism.”  Resnik, supra note 16, at 48. 
179 EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN 
U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 68–69 (1998). 
180 The possibility of state breaches of international law has been foreseen 
since our founding and is uncontroversial as a matter of international law.  See, 
e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987) (“The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the 
conduct of its members.”); see also Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts,  G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, art. 4(1), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/56/83/Annex (Dec. 12, 2001) (“The conduct of any State organ shall be 
considered an act of that State under international law . . . whatever its character 
as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.”). 
 The obverse proposition, that states may comply with international law, 
should be both obvious and uncontroversial in the ordinary course—though 
Powell and Resnik (among others) flag the interesting trend of states opting to 
comply with norms established in treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”), not (yet) ratified by the United States.  See Powell, supra note 14, at 
276–80; Resnik, supra note 16, at 49–62; cf. Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellín, 
Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 755, 760–61 (2006) (describing a “norm portal” as “an alternative 
pathway” for human rights norms to enter a domestic legal system without the 
formal approval of the national government).  For a contemporary example where 
the states of Oklahoma and Texas took sharply opposed approaches towards 
compliance with international law, see infra notes 186 to 198 and accompanying 
text. 
181 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150 
(2d ed. 1996). 
182 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 
(1936) (describing the “President as the sole organ of the Federal government in 
the field of international relations”); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/4
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Cleveland exposes this as a myth.183  She gives examples of state 
resolutions expressing views on foreign policy dating back to the 
undeclared war with France in 1798 and the war of 1812,184 and of a 
variety of ways in which the federal government has tolerated and 
even abetted state concerns affecting foreign relations.  As 
inaccurate as “one voice” has proved historically as a description, 
trends towards both the disaggregation of states and the rise of 
non-state actors on the international plane will render it 
unrecognizable.185 
Doctrinally, it is difficult to see how the “one voice” notion can 
be said to survive the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Medellín 
v. Texas.186  The United States is a party to a consular treaty that 
requires the police to inform aliens under arrest “without delay” of 
their right to receive consular assistance from their home 
government.187  In practice, as so much of our criminal justice 
system is left to the states, the burden of compliance with this 
notice rule falls mainly on the states.  “[T]he individual States’ 
(often confessed) noncompliance with the treaty has been a vexing 
 
441 U.S. 434, 452–53 (1979) (holding that a California tax impeded the nation’s 
ability to “speak with one voice”); Crosby v. United States, 530 U.S. 363, 381 
(stating that Massachusetts’ Burma law “compromise[s] the very capacity of the 
President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other 
governments”); see also Cleveland, supra note 6, at 979–84 (reviewing cases). 
183 See generally Cleveland, supra note 6. 
184 Id. at 993. 
185 Even the federal government predicts with “relative certaint[y]” that 
“[t]he international system—as constructed following the Second World War—
will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to . . . [among others] the growing 
influence of nonstate actors,” such as “businesses, tribes, religious organizations, 
and criminal networks.”  U.S. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: 
A TRANSFORMED WORLD iv, vi (2008), available at http://www.dni.gov/nic 
/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).  
Indeed, the Executive Branch itself speaks more often abroad with multiple 
voices.  Compare Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 
183, 184 (1997) (lauding the potential of transnational networks of regulators, 
judges, militaries, etc.), with George F. Kennan, Diplomacy Without Diplomats? 76 
FOREIGN AFF., 198, 204 (1997) (lamenting trends towards “fragmented 
diplomacy”). 
186 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) [hereinafter Medellín 
II].  For a variety of perspectives on this case, see generally David J. Bederman, 
Agora: Medellín: Medellín’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 
529 (2008) (presenting articles by Professors Bederman, Bradley, Charnovitz, and 
Vásquez). 
187 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on 
Disputes, art. 36(1)(b),  Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77 (1970). 
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problem,”188 embroiling the United States in international 
controversies with Germany, Paraguay and most notably 
Mexico.189  On behalf of fifty-one Mexican nationals on death row 
in the United States, Mexico successfully challenged the U.S. 
breach of the consular treaty before the International Court of 
Justice.  As a remedy, the ICJ ordered the United States to ensure 
that—notwithstanding any “procedural default” bars under 
domestic law to objections raised for the first time after 
conviction—the covered individuals receive further process to 
determine whether they had suffered any prejudice from the 
breach.190  Although the United Nations Charter obliges the United 
States to comply with ICJ orders,191 the federal government initially 
left compliance to the discretion of the states.  In 2004, the 
Governor of Oklahoma voluntarily complied with the ICJ order by 
commuting the sentence of a covered individual from death to 
life.192  Texas, however, refused to implement the ICJ order, 
insisting on its procedural default bar to new arguments.  In 2005, 
when the Supreme Court was to decide whether the ICJ order 
preempted application of Texas’ procedural default rule, President 
Bush issued a “memorandum” requiring the states to comply with 
the ICJ order.193  Texas persisted with its objections.  The issue 
returned to the Supreme Court, with the weight of the Presidential 
action added to that of the ICJ order itself.  Yet the Court sided 
with Texas, apparently finding a “presumption of non-self-
 
188 Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 674 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
[hereinafter Medellín I]. 
189 See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31) (concerning U.S. failure to notify Mexican nationals); 
LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) (concerning U.S. failure to 
notify German nationals); Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9) (concerning U.S. failure to notify 
Paraguayan nationals). 
190 Avena Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. at para. 133–34, 153(9). 
191 See U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1 (“Each Member of the United Nations 
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any 
case to which it is a party.”). 
192 See John R. Crook, ed., Oklahoma Court Finds Accused Was Prejudiced by 
Lack of Consular Notification in Death Penalty Case, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 695–96 
(2005) (recounting the actions taken by Oklahoma to comply with the Avena 
Judgment); Janet Koven Levit, A Tale of International Law in the Heartland: Torres 
and the Role of State Courts in Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 163, 171–72 (2004) (same). 
193 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the U.S. Attorney 
General (Feb. 28, 2005), reprinted in 44 INT’L LEG. MATERIALS 964 (2005). 
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execution” of treaties robust enough to impede even Presidential 
efforts to prevent future breaches of one treaty intended to remedy 
past breaches of another treaty.194  Notably, the Court so decided 
without a single mention of “one voice” or “sole organ.”  
Moreover, even though the Court recognized that the United States 
has a duty under international law to comply with the ICJ order 
and the natural consequence of its reasoning is that Congress 
should authorize the President to implement the ICJ order in 
domestic law195, it later refused to stay Texas’ execution of José 
Medellín for a reasonable period of Congressional consideration.196  
The Court thus knowingly enabled Texas to execute a Mexican 
national in deliberate violation of U.S. treaty obligations, contrary 
to the express preference of the President to resolve an ongoing 
controversy with the Government of Mexico.197  The Court failed at 
perhaps its most basic duty:  to prevent “the peace of the whole” 
from being “left at the disposal of a part.”198 
Cleveland aptly proposes replacing the “one voice” concept 
with that of a Chorus.199  The Chorus metaphor may be developed 
 
194 See Medellín II, 128 S.Ct. at 1380–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]nsofar as 
today’s majority . . . erects clear statement presumptions designed to help find an 
answer [whether a treaty self-executes], it is misguided. . . .  At best the Court is 
hunting the snark.  At worst it erects legalistic hurdles that can threaten the 
application of provisions in many existing commercial and other treaties and 
make it more difficult to negotiate new ones.”); accord id. at 1372 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the dissent that constitutional and 
treaty law “do not support a presumption against self-execution”).  But see id. at 
1366 (Roberts, C.J., writing for the Court) (rejecting the dissent’s reading as “a 
caricature of the Court’s opinion”). 
195 See id. at 1367 (“[W]hile the ICJ’s judgment in Avena creates an 
international law obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own 
force constitute binding federal law . . . .”). 
196 See Medellín v. Texas, 554 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 360 (2008) [hereinafter Medellín 
III] (denying Medellín’s request to stay his execution); James C. McKinley Jr., 
Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A19. 
197 See Medellín III, 129 S.Ct. at 364 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]o permit this 
execution to proceed forthwith places the United States irremediably in violation 
of international law and breaks our treaty promises,” even though “the President 
of the United States has emphasized the importance of carrying out our treaty-
based obligations in this case . . . .”). 
198 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the scope of 
the federal judicial power). 
199  Cleveland, supra note 6, at 1014 states: 
The [Crosby] Court thus failed to recognize the possibility and the reality 
that state and local voices do not inherently clash with national policy, but 
may instead help to promote a richer harmony of action by the United 
States as a whole.  The ultimate power of the national government to 
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further, as the President sometimes:  sings solo; sings (more or less 
harmonious) duets with Congress or the judiciary (or trios with 
both); remains silent to allow other voices to be heard; conducts a 
chorus of other voices; and competes with others (most notably, 
Congress) to determine what song will be sung when, by whom, in 
what key, and at what tempo and volume.  Accordingly, in 
Barclays, the Supreme Court recognized Congress, not the 
President, as “the preeminent speaker” on foreign commerce, and 
noted that Congress “decided to yield the floor to others,” namely 
the states, in that case.200 
In a country said to have 39,000 local governments,201 allowing 
them any voice at all surely presents diplomatic challenges for the 
President.  But it also presents diplomatic opportunities.  
Conducting an orchestra may present greater coordination 
challenges than singing solo or leading a string quartet, but it also 
offers a much richer and wider range of musical possibilities.202  
The President may choose to remain silent while letting others 
sing, and may even, offstage, encourage others to sing. 203  The 
President may encourage the states to prevail on Congress to enact 
legislation empowering him to pursue foreign policy objectives.204  
He may call state speech to the attention of other governments to 
put (or escalate) items on the diplomatic agenda or to strengthen 
his negotiating position, for example, by highlighting the depth or 
breadth of public concern or by giving the President a chip that 
may be bargained (through preemption, if need be). 
 
silence Massachusetts was not in question; its constitutional authority to 
do so is clear.  But where the national branches have tolerated and abetted 
a chorus that includes the states, the Court should not employ implied 
preemption to protect the political branches from having to exercise the 
authority they have been constitutionally granted.   
200 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 328–29 
(1994). 
201 Natsios, 181 F.3d at 54. 
202 A. Bartlett Giamatti nicely captures both the possibilities and frustrations 
suggested here, when describing his own presidency of Yale University: “On a 
good day, I view the job as directing an orchestra.  On the dark days, it is more 
like that of a clutch engaging the engine to effect forward motion, while taking 
greater friction.”  William E. Geist, The Outspoken President of Yale, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Mar. 6, 1983, at 42. 
203 Cf. HENKIN, supra note 181, at 164–65 (“Domestic considerations apart, 
there might be foreign relations reasons why the political branches might deem it 
desirable to leave some matters to the states rather than deal with them by formal 
federal action.”). 
204 An example of this is discussed supra note 147. 
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As an alternative to widening the voice metaphor, one might 
simply abandon it.  Porterfield reminds us of Judge Cardozo’s 
warning that “metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for 
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving 
it.”205  Here, while the voice metaphor conjures images of 
expression, the Court does not genuinely concern itself with 
expression, but with the impact of state regulation on Presidential 
control over diplomacy.206  Hence, in Giannoulias, the district court 
properly insisted that the threshold is actual interference with 
federal policy, not mere expression.207 
4.2. Manifestations of Constitutional Doctrine 
Flawed as the “one voice” notion is, it manifests itself in three 
constitutional standards by which state actions implicating foreign 
affairs are typically judged:  preemption by federal statute, 
incompatibility with the dormant effects of the Foreign Commerce 
Clause, and impermissible intrusion into the exclusive preserve of 
the federal government to control foreign affairs. 
 
205 Porterfield, supra note 87, at 16, n. 105 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. 
Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926)). 
206 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003) (“’Quite 
simply, if the [California] law is enforceable the President has less to offer and less 
economic and diplomatic leverage as a consequence.’  The law thus 
‘compromise[s] the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one 
voice in dealing with other governments’ to resolve claims against European 
companies arising out of World War II.” (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 377 (2000))). 
207 See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 744–
45  (N.D. Ill. 2007): 
Though the cases place an emphasis on the ability of the president to 
speak for the nation with “one voice,” . . . the inquiry quite obviously 
does not end there.  For example, Zschernig and Garamendi would not 
appear to prohibit a state or local government from issuing a resolution 
condemning the actions of a foreign government, even if the national 
government had made no such declaration or did not support such a 
view.  In such a case, although the United States would not be speaking 
with “one voice,” the absence of actual hindrance to the national 
government’s conduct of foreign policy would appear to preserve the 
state or local enactment.  Without some tangible effect or the risk of such 
an effect, it would be difficult to see how a state or local policy could 
interfere with the national government’s conduct of foreign affairs . . . 
Rather, Zschernig and Garamendi are both concerned with the practical 
effect a state law might have on the national government’s ability to 
conduct foreign policy on behalf of the United States. 
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Massachusetts’ Burma law may be mentioned here as an 
organizational reference point, because the courts scrutinized it 
under all three of these standards.  The federal district court in 
Massachusetts held the law unconstitutional under the dormant 
foreign affairs power.208  It rejected the statutory preemption 
argument and declined to reach the issue of dormant foreign 
commerce.209  The First Circuit affirmed, sub nom. Natsios, holding 
the Massachusetts law unconstitutional on all three grounds.210  
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari on all three 
issues,211 it affirmed in Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, solely 
on the ground that Massachusetts’ Burma law is “invalid . . . owing 
to its threat of frustrating federal statutory objectives.”212  Crosby 
declined to address both the Commerce Clause and foreign-affairs 
power arguments.213 
4.2.1. Statutory Preemption 
The power of Congress to preempt state law may be said to 
flow from the Supremacy214 and Necessary and Proper Clauses of 
the Constitution.215  Where Congress does not expressly preempt 
state law, the courts will imply preemption in three circumstances, 
which are “not rigidly distinct”216:  where there is an actual conflict 
 
208 See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass. 
1998) (holding that the Massachusetts Burma Law “unconstitutionally impinges 
on the federal government’s exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs”). 
209 Id. at 293. 
210 Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F. 3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1999). 
211 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 371–72 (2000). 
212 Id. at 366. 
213 Id. at 374 n.8 (“Because our conclusion that the state Act conflicts with 
federal law is sufficient to affirm the judgment below, we decline . . . to pass on 
the First Circuit’s rulings addressing the foreign affairs power or the dormant 
Foreign Commerce Clause.”); see also Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 440 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (describing Crosby as “a statutory preemption case”). 
214 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
215 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing Congress “[t]o make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
216 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372 n.6 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 
79 n.5 (1990) (internal punctuation omitted)). 
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between federal and state law (“conflict preemption”); where 
Congress “occupies the field,” leaving no room for further state 
regulation of the same subject matter (“field preemption”); and 
where state law is an obstacle to the fulfillment of the objectives of 
the federal law (“obstacle preemption”).217 
In Crosby, neither express preemption nor conflict preemption 
was at issue.  The Court nominally declines to address field 
preemption, while construing obstacle preemption in a way that is 
“not rigidly distinct” from field preemption.218  Crosby deems 
Massachusetts’ Burma law “an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
Congress’s full objectives” under the federal Burma statute, 
explaining: 
We find that the state law undermines the intended 
purpose and “natural effect” of at least three provisions of 
the federal Act, that is, its delegation of effective discretion 
to the President to control economic sanctions against 
Burma, its limitation of sanctions solely to United States 
persons and new investment, and its directive to the 
President to proceed diplomatically in developing a 
comprehensive, multilateral strategy toward Burma.219 
Although the details of the statutory analysis depend on the 
particulars of the federal and state legislation at issue in Crosby, the 
Court’s approach suggests that it accepts, at least to some degree, 
the Clinton Justice Department’s argument that statutory 
preemption applies “more readily” in the international context.220  
Notably, the Court finds that Massachusetts law posed an obstacle 
to federal objectives in circumstances where it seems that Congress 
knew of the Massachusetts action, shared Massachusetts’ concerns, 
and cooperated with Massachusetts to enact a federal statute that 
did not expressly preempt Massachusetts law.221  Its approach 
 
217 See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6.28–
.31, at 1172–1212 (3d ed. 2000). 
218 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372 n. 6. 
219 Id. at 373–74. 
220 See U.S. Amicus Brief in Crosby, supra note 84, at 14; see also id. at 30 
(arguing that the “Supremacy Clause applies with special force to state laws that 
deal with foreign commerce and foreign policy”). 
221 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 377–78.  One Congressional aide describes Crosby as 
having “no grounding in legislative reality.” Spiro, supra note 113, at 51 
(summarizing comments of Steve Rademaker, chief counsel to the House 
International Relations Committee). The chief sponsor of Massachusetts’ Burma 
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reveals the influence of the “one voice” school, at the least with 
regard to the third Congressional objective mentioned by the 
Court:  effective diplomacy.  The Court writes: 
 It is not merely that the differences between the state and 
federal Acts in scope and type of sanctions threaten to 
complicate discussions; they compromise the very capacity 
of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in 
dealing with other governments.  We need not get into any 
general consideration of limits of state action affecting 
foreign affairs to realize that the President’s maximum 
power to persuade rests on his capacity to bargain for the 
benefits of access to the entire national economy without 
exception for enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent 
political tactics.222 
Because Crosby purports to limit itself to statutory construction, 
but also arguably engages in non-statutory analysis, it “has 
provoked substantial academic commentary that is noteworthy for 
its widely differing interpretations of the opinion.”223  Suffice to 
say, for present purposes, that broader readings of Crosby cast 
darker doctrinal clouds over state actions—with less regard for the 
details of either the federal or state statutes.224 
 
law similarly notes that Crosby “said that we had been preempted by the 
legislation that we of course helped to pass in the United States Congress.  Powell, 
supra note 14, at 289–90 n.189 (2001) (quoting Byron Rushing). 
222 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381. 
223 CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 400 (3d ed. 2008) (summarizing academic literature about Crosby). 
224 Sarah Cleveland warns that a broad reading of Crosby could “potentially 
disrupt two centuries of constitutional practice in foreign relations,” invalidating 
state actions long tolerated by Congress.  Cleveland, supra note 6, at 1013; see also 
id. at 976 (same).  Likewise, Resnik argues that too-ready invocation of implied 
preemption can “expand the unilateralism of [federal] executive authority”: 
 I am a critic of the new preemption rules in which judges shape quasi-
constitutional doctrines limiting federalism’s iterative opportunities.  I 
commend revisiting the growing presumption in favor of executive or 
congressional foreign affairs preemption, and flipping it in favor of local 
initiatives.  Before finding that national action is the exclusive means of 
interacting with “the foreign,” judges ought to require specific national 
legislative directives as well as the presentation of detailed factual 
information about how concurrent or overlapping rules (federal and 
state) do harm national interests.  By insisting on “clear statement rules” 
from Congress and specific factual predicates about the harms of 
concurrency before preempting local initiatives, the courts would be 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/4
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4.2.2. The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause authorizes the Congress to regulate 
foreign and interstate commerce.225  Under longstanding judicial 
construction of this clause, it also has dormant (or negative) aspects 
that limit state interference with foreign and interstate commerce 
even in the absence of Congressional action.226  This is not to say, of 
course, that the states are barred from any regulation of commerce 
whatsoever.  Rather, there are areas where “local and national 
powers are concurrent,” in which “the Court in the absence of 
congressional guidance is called upon to make ‘delicate adjustment 
of the conflicting state and federal claims.’”227 
In the domestic context, Supreme Court jurisprudence 
establishes that a state may act as an “ordinary market participant” 
without running afoul of the Dormant Interstate Commerce 
Clause.228  The Court has never decided, however, whether the 
ordinary market participant doctrine applies to Foreign 
 
letting the “political safeguards of federalism” (to return to Wechsler’s 
phrase) serve as a primary mechanism to “safeguard nationalism. 
Resnik, supra note 16, at 41–42.  Berman agrees: 
At the very least, courts should carefully interrogate the claimed 
justification of preemption to ensure that the local action at issue poses a 
real, rather than conjectural, threat to the federal government’s conduct.  
After all, pluralism is built into the structure of federalism, and so actions 
of localities to import international or foreign norms or signal solidarity 
with them should not easily be displaced. 
Berman, supra note 15, at 1200–01. 
225 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
226 For an introduction to the plentiful case law and academic literature on 
the dormant Commerce Clause, see TRIBE, supra note 217, §§ 6.1–.25, at 1021–1159.  
For recent controversy, see Dep’t. of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 
(2008) (showcasing seven different judicial opinions on the interpretation and 
application of the dormant Commerce Clause). 
227 See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976) (quoting 
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 553 (1949)); Pike v. Bruce 
Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
228 See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) 
(“Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clauses prohibits a State . . . 
from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens 
over others.”); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980) (“[T]he Commerce 
Clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free 
private trade in the marketplace.  There is no indication of a constitutional plan to 
limit the ability of the states themselves to operate freely in the free market.”). 
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Commerce229—and it differentiates between the Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Clauses in certain respects, including reference 
to the “one voice” test for the latter.230 
Natsios expressly invokes the “one voice” prong of Foreign 
Commerce doctrine as a ground for ruling against 
Massachusetts.231  It also suggests two other doctrinal challenges 
for state divestment.  First, the First Circuit considers it “unlikely 
that the market participant exception applies to the Foreign 
Commerce Clause,” while leaving a definitive ruling on this point 
“to another day and another case.”232  Second, the First Circuit 
considers that Massachusetts had not acted as an ordinary market 
participant.  The court characterizes Massachusetts as “attempting 
to impose on companies with which it does business conditions 
 
229 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 n.9 (1980) (“We have no occasion to explore the 
limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the ‘foreign commerce’ clause,” but 
such “scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce 
is alleged.”). 
230 See Barclays, 512 U.S. at 311 (following Japan Line because of “the special 
need for federal uniformity” in “the unique context of foreign commerce”); Japan 
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (adding to Dormant 
Foreign Commerce analysis of state taxation consideration whether the tax creates 
risk of multiple taxation or prevents the nation from “speaking with one voice” 
when dealing with other nations).  Saikrishna Prakash criticizes this line of cases 
as inappropriately creating multiple meanings of common language in a single 
sentence.  See Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption 
of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1162–65 (2003).  But see Adrian 
Vermuele, Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (2003) 
(arguing that Prakash’s originalist textual arguments should not apply to 
Dormant Commerce analysis, as “[t]here is no Dormant Commerce Clause” to 
subject to intrasentence textual analysis) (emphasis in original). 
231 Natsios, 181 F.3d at 68–69. 
232 Id. at 65–66.  The federal district court in Puerto Rico relied on Natsios in 
holding that the market participant rule does not apply to Foreign Commerce.  See 
Antilles Cement Corp. v. Calderon, 288 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.P.R. 2003).  Other 
authorities, including the Reagan and Clinton Justice Departments, are to the 
contrary.  See OLC, South African Divestment, supra note 81, at 50 n.4 (“Although 
the Court expressly reserved the question of whether the market participant 
doctrine applies to the state statutes that affect foreign, as opposed to interstate, 
commerce, we believe that the rationale for the distinction—that the Commerce 
Clause was intended to restrict a state’s ability to regulate but not its ability to 
participate in markets—applies equally to statutes that affect foreign commerce.”); 
U.S. Amicus Brief in Crosby, supra note 84, at 13–14 (“[I]n our view, the market-
participant exception recognized under the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause 
extends at least in some measure to foreign commerce as well . . . .”); Baltimore 
Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 752–53 (holding the market participant rule applies 
to Foreign Commerce); Trojan Tech., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 
1990) (same). 
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that apply to activities not even remotely connected to such 
companies’ interactions with Massachusetts.”233  In the court’s 
view, such concern for remote matters “goes beyond ordinary 
private market conduct.”234 
4.2.3. The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power 
The Constitution gives certain powers affecting foreign 
relations to the President,235 the Congress,236 the “treaty-makers,”237 
and the federal courts238—while simultaneously limiting 
participation in foreign affairs by the states.239  The Constitution 
 
233 Natsios, 181 F.3d at 63. 
234 Id. at 64–65; accord Lucien J. Dhooge, Darfur, State Divestment Initiatives, 
and the Commerce Clause, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 391, 439 (2007) (arguing, 
inter alia, that Natsios renders the Illinois Sudan statute unconstitutional because 
that statute “is not proprietary, as it represents an economically irrational action 
that would not be taken by a private contracting party”).  Contra OLC, South 
African Divestment, supra note 81, at 53: 
[S]tate divestment statutes are plainly proprietary in nature.  In refusing 
to invest its funds in or contract with corporations doing business in 
South Africa, a state is exercising the prerogatives and the powers that 
any private person or entity enjoys as a matter of contract and property 
rights.  The state is not employing the sovereign power that it uniquely 
enjoys in its jurisdiction to compel action under the threat of 
punishment. 
Baltimore Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 749–52; Benczkowski Letter, supra note 12, 
at 4 (arguing that SADA is “not necessary for States to engage in certain market-
based divestitures”).  The Clinton Justice Department agreed with Natsios that the 
Massachusetts Burma law improperly regulated “companies’ conduct unrelated 
to their performance of contractual obligations to the State,” but expressly 
distinguished divestment as potentially legitimate.  See U.S. Amicus Brief in 
Crosby, supra note 84, at 26–29. 
235 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (commander in chief of the army and 
navy); cl. 3 (receive ambassadors). 
236 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (define offenses against the law of 
nations); cl. 11 (declare war). 
237 The President may make treaties with the “advice and consent” of the 
Senate, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, so the President and Senate may be 
collectively described as the “treaty-makers.”  See generally Louis Henkin, The 
Treaty-Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1151 
(1956) (discussing relationships between the federal legislative and treaty 
powers). 
238 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (cases arising under treaties, cases affecting 
ambassadors, and cases between U.S. citizens and foreign nations or citizens 
thereof). 
239 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (no treaties or alliances), cl. 2 (strict 
restrictions on duties on imports or exports), & cl. 3 (no compacts except as 
approved by Congress). 
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does not describe an overarching foreign affairs power, much less 
assign that power to any one branch of government.240  In 
constitutional practice, however, it has come to be recognized that 
the federal government as a whole has broad powers over foreign 
relations241 and that the President generally has the prime242—
though not unlimited—role in exercising those powers.243 
In 1947, the question arose whether California had intruded 
into an exclusive zone of federal control over foreign affairs by 
conditioning inheritance rights for aliens on whether the alien’s 
home country allowed inheritance by U.S. citizens (i.e., 
reciprocity).  In Clark v. Allen, the Supreme Court, per Justice 
Douglas, rejected this contention as “farfetched.”244  In 1968, in 
Zschernig v. Miller, Justice Douglas wrote again for the Supreme 
Court in a case examining Oregon’s reciprocity requirement for 
transnational inheritance.245  This time, the Court made “new 
constitutional doctrine.”246  Zschernig held that Oregon 
unconstitutionally “intru[ded] . . . into the field of foreign affairs 
which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the 
 
240 See HENKIN, supra note 181, at 84 (“The Constitution is especially 
inarticulate in allocating foreign affairs powers.”).  But see Saikrishna Prakash & 
Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 234 
(2001) (arguing that the original meaning of the “executive power” assigned to the 
President includes “residual” foreign affairs power subject to express limitations 
in other constitutional provisions). 
241 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315–16 
(1936) (“The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers 
except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied 
powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is 
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs.”). 
242 See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (upholding a 
sole executive agreement on the ground that “the Executive had authority to 
speak as the sole organ of [the national] government”); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 
319-20 (“the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of 
the nation. . . .  As Marshall said . . ., ‘The President is the sole organ of the nation 
in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.’”). 
243 See, e.g., Medellín II (disallowing Presidential claim of right to order Texas 
to waive its procedural default bar to postconviction review in order to secure 
compliance with adverse decision by the International Court of Justice); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (disallowing 
Presidential claim of right to nationalize steel industry during the Korean War). 
244 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947). 
245 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
246 HENKIN, supra note 181, at 163.  For an originalist critique of Zschernig, see 
generally Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of States in Foreign Affairs: The Original 
Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341 (1999). 
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Congress”247—thereby suggesting a zone of federal exclusivity into 
which states are barred from entry even in the absence of any 
“supreme” federal action under Article VI, a notion that might be 
regarded as the literal embodiment of the “one voice” metaphor (at 
least from a vertical point of view).  Just as the Commerce Clause is 
construed to have negative implications, Zschernig found a 
dormant foreign affairs power that limits state action even when 
the federal government is silent.  It did so absent a real 
demonstration of harm to U.S. foreign policy, indeed, in the face of 
a U.S. Government amicus brief disclaiming any such harm.248  
Despite the similarities between the two cases, Zschernig did not 
reverse Clark.  Zschernig instead distinguished Clark on the ground 
that reciprocity requirements are constitutional on their face, but 
Oregon’s law became problematic in practice because of the 
detailed, intrusive way in which Oregon implemented it.249 
The Supreme Court barely cited Zschernig for the next 35 years.  
Calling Zschernig “a unique statement and a sole application of 
constitutional doctrine,” Henkin wrote in 1996:  “One would be 
bold to predict that it has a future life; might it remain on the 
Supreme Court’s pages, a relic of the Cold War?”250 
 
247 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432. 
248 The Court characterizes the harm as “subtle,” if also as “persistent” and 
“direct.”  It concludes only that the Oregon law “may well”—not that it does—
”adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with [international] 
problems.”  Id. at 440–41.  Justice Harlan’s separate opinion, concurring only in 
the judgment, rejects the Court’s reasoning as “based almost entirely on 
speculation.”  Id. at 460.  Justice Harlan observes that the Court’s opinion and the 
record lack “any instance . . . [of] any foreign relations consequence whatsoever,” 
and quotes the Solicitor General as saying that “[s]tate reciprocity laws, including 
that of Oregon, have had little effect on the foreign relations and policy of this 
country.”  Id. 
249 Id. at 433–34.  Justice Stewart’s concurrence expressly supports reversing 
Clark to establish, more clearly than the opinion of the Court, that states are barred 
from “voyag[ing] into a domain of exclusively federal competence,” as a 
fundamental matter of allocation of constitutional authorities unaffected by “the 
shifting winds at the State Department.”  Id. at 442–43. 
250 HENKIN, supra note 181, at 165 & note; see also Peter Spiro, Foreign Relations 
Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1224–25, 1242 (1999) (arguing that the 
“exclusivity principle,” as perfected in Zschernig, is historically contingent and 
should be moderated to allow some room for state action in the international 
realm because strict exclusivity is no longer necessary outside a Cold War context 
where “one could plausibly draw a scenario in which offense caused by state 
action lit the fuse to World War III” and could not be stopped by the federal 
government “before the damage was done”). 
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Then, in 2003, the Supreme Court “resurrect[ed]” Zschernig—at 
least to a degree.251  Garamendi invalidated California’s Holocaust 
Victim Insurance Relief Act, which “require[d] any insurer doing 
business in that State to disclose information about all policies sold 
in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by the company itself or any one 
‘related’ to it,” as inconsistent with Presidential efforts to resolve 
Holocaust-related insurance disputes.252  The Court clearly treated 
Zschernig seriously for the first time, but seemed to fall short of 
endorsing Zschernig’s view of preclusive exclusivity.  Its logic is not 
that of exclusivity, but of preemption.253  In that regard, Garamendi 
seems better understood as extending Crosby’s invigorated view of 
preemption in the foreign affairs context from statutory 
preemption to Presidential preemption,254 at least with regard to 
the “particularly longstanding practice” of Presidential settlement 
of international claims.255 
Problems with current doctrine on the dormant foreign affairs 
power include the absence of definition to critical contours of the 
doctrine (such as its relationships to Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence),256 the difficulty of meaningfully reconciling Clark 
and Zschernig to distill principles predictably applicable to other 
 
251 American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (2003) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We have not relied on Zschernig since it was decided, 
and I would not resurrect that decision here.”). 
252 Id. at 401. 
253 See, e.g., id. at 425 (“The express federal policy and the clear conflict raised 
by the state statute are alone enough to require state law to yield.”). 
254 See Julian Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2398–2401 
(2006) (arguing that Garamendi, unlike Zschernig, preserves constitutional space for 
state involvement in foreign relations). 
255 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415; see also Medellín II, 128 S.Ct. at 1371–72 
(describing Garamendi as part of “a series of cases” that establish a “narrow and 
strictly limited [Presidential] authority to settle international claims disputes”). 
256 Zschernig does not concern the Commerce Clause.  The word “commerce” 
appears nowhere in the case.  Oregon was not regulating commerce, but setting 
the terms of inheritance under state law.  By contrast, in Garamendi, California was 
regulating the insurance industry.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on three 
questions in Garamendi, including both foreign affairs and foreign commerce.  In 
the end, however Garamendi decides only the foreign affairs issue, expressly 
declining to reach the other two issues, without providing any guidance as to why 
it omits the Foreign Commerce issue or how the foreign affairs and foreign 
commerce doctrines relate with each other.  Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 429–441; 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 396–400. 
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facts,257 and uncertainty about when the doctrine will be deemed to 
apply.  It seems that lower courts may invoke the doctrine more 
often and more expansively than does the Supreme Court; for 
example, Natsios relies on Zschernig and construes it to exclude an 
exception for ordinary market participation.258 
5. SADA’S PLACE IN FOREIGN-RELATIONS FEDERALISM 
5.1. Divestment under Federal Authority 
The key provision of SADA, Section 3(b), provides: 
 Authority to Divest—Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, a State or local government may adopt 
and enforce measures that meet the requirements of 
subsection (e) to divest the assets of the State or local 
government from, or prohibit investment of the assets of 
the State or local government in, persons that the State or 
local government determines, using credible information 
available to the public, are conducting or have direct 
investments in business operations described in subsection 
(d).259 
 
257 Attempting to reconcile Clark with Zschernig, the Office of Legal Counsel 
describes the latter as a “reaction to a particular regulatory statute”—i.e., that it is 
limited to its facts.  OLC, South African Divestment, supra note 75, at 50. 
258 Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 50–61 (1st Cir. 1999).  
By contrast, the Office of Legal Counsel argues that the market participant rule 
should apply in the foreign affairs context as well, on the ground that states need 
space for proprietary acts.  OLC, South African Divestment, supra note 75, at 63–64. 
259 SADA, supra note 9, § 3(b).  SADA further defines “investment” to include 
“the entry into or renewal of a contract for goods or services,” suggesting that the 
authority in Section 3(b) is broad enough to allow states to refuse to enter or 
renew procurement contracts with companies doing specified business in Sudan.  
See Jerry Fowler and Zahara Heckscher, Introductory Note to the Sudan 
Accountability and Investment Act of 2007 and the Signing Statement of President 
George W. Bush to the Act, 47 I.L.M. 127 (2008).  Indeed, SADA requires the federal 
government to restrict its own purchases of goods and services from such 
companies (subject to the possibility of a Presidential waiver).  SADA, § 6.  The 
procurement aspects of SADA are beyond the scope of this Article, which as 
mentioned supra note 2, is limited to “investment” decisions typically understood 
as distinct from purchases of goods and services.  See, e.g., Iran Sanctions Act, 
§ 14(9), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (“the term ‘investment’ does not include the entry into, 
performance of, or financing of a contract to sell or purchase goods, services, or 
technology”); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104–208, 
110 Stat. 3009, Sept. 30, 1996, § 570(f)(2) (same, with respect to definition of “new 
investment” for sanctions against Burma); North American Free Trade 
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As this provision makes clear, Congress bounded the authority 
it granted the states in a number of respects.  First, the authority to 
divest is limited to companies with business operations in 
Sudan.260  Second, the authority is limited to companies with 
operations in four specified industries: “power production 
activities, mineral extraction activities, oil-related activities, or the 
production of military equipment.”261  Third, the authority does 
not extend to companies that have “voluntarily suspended” their 
activities in Sudan or that can demonstrate that their activities 
conform with federal policy concerning Sudan, such as contracts 
with the regional government in Southern Sudan, humanitarian 
activities, and activities licensed by the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“OFAC”).262  
Fourth, the authority to divest is conditioned on the satisfaction of 
procedural requirements intended to provide each target company 
“written notice and an opportunity to comment in writing,” in the 
pursuit of accuracy and (presumably) due process.263  Fifth, the 
authority to divest is limited to companies that “have direct 
investments in Sudan.”264  Sixth, the authority to divest includes 
assets owned or managed (e.g., pension funds) by the states, but 
excludes those assets governed by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”).265  Finally, the authority to divest 
ends thirty days after the President certifies that Sudan has met 
certain conditions assuring peace and safety for civilian 
populations.266 
 
Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1991, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), art. 1139(i) 
(“investment does not mean . . . claims to money that arise solely from . . . 
commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services . . . .”). 
260 SADA § 3(d)(1).  No other country is the subject of similar legislation, 
although Congress has been considering a similar bill directed against Iran.  See 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, S. 3445 & 
H. R. 7112, 110th Cong. (2008). 
261 SADA § 3(d)(1). 
262 SADA § 3(d)(2). 
263 SADA § 3(e). 
264 SADA § 3(b); see also §§ SADA 3(e)(3), 3(e)(4), 4, 5. 
265 SADA § 3(f)(2).  The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–03 (2008), does not apply to most state-managed pension funds.  
29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); see also JOHN LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 96–98 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing ERISA’s scope and 
exemptions). 
266 SADA § 12. 
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The bounded nature of the authority to divest is also implied 
by SADA’s “nonpreemption” provision, which specifies that 
divestment within the scope of the statutory authorization “is not 
preempted by any Federal law or regulation.”267 
5.2. Dispelling Doctrinal Clouds 
It is fair to say that the Sudan divestment movement was born 
under doctrinal clouds cast by Crosby, Garamendi, and Zschernig.  
These clouds should be neither overstated nor ignored.  None of 
the above cases addresses state divestment per se.  Two lower 
court decisions, and an opinion of the Reagan Justice Department, 
are more pertinent.  They provide a non-definitive degree of 
support for the view that state divestment is constitutional. 
First, in 1986, months before Congress enacted the CAAA over 
President Reagan’s veto, the Reagan Justice Department examined 
state divestment under pre-CAAA law.268  “[A]s many as 140” 
jurisdictions divested from (or imposed selective-purchasing 
restrictions concerning) South Africa, in clear defiance of the 
Reagan Administration’s preferred strategy of constructive 
engagement with South Africa.269  Yet the opinion of the Office of 
Legal Counsel concludes that such divestment is constitutional—
specifically, it is protected by the ordinary market participation 
doctrine, it reflects a traditional exercise of state control over state 
assets that does not intrude unduly into federal foreign-relations 
prerogatives, and then-existing federal rules regarding South 
Africa did not preempt it.270 
Three years later, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld 
Baltimore ordinances divesting from South Africa against 
 
267 SADA § 3(g) (emphasis added). 
268 See generally OLC, South African Divestment, supra note 81 (outlining 
constitutionality of local divestment statutes). 
269 Cleveland, supra note 6, at 995. 
270 The OLC opinion treats divestment measures together with selective-
purchasing measures like the Massachusetts Burma law, finding both 
constitutional under the same analysis.  See OLC, South African Divestment, supra 
note 81, at 49 n.3 (referring to both divestment measures and selective-purchasing 
measures as “divestment statutes”).  The Clinton Justice Department later 
disavowed the OLC opinion as applied to selective-purchasing measures.  See U.S. 
Amicus Brief in Crosby, supra note 84, at 29 n.23 (“[A] statute like the 
Massachusetts Burma Act does not fall within the market participation 
exception.”). 
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constitutional and other legal challenges.271  Baltimore Board of 
Trustees holds that the CAAA did not preempt state divestment, 
that the ordinary market participant doctrine applies to exempt 
Baltimore from the disciplines of the Dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause, and that Baltimore’s divestment involved one-time 
judgments more like California’s actions at issue in Clark than the 
ongoing analyses by Oregon deemed problematic in Zschernig.272 
Finally, in Giannoulias, the federal district court in Chicago 
struck down portions of the Illinois Sudan law. 273  The Illinois law 
provided, inter alia, for divestment from Sudan of assets controlled 
by both the state and city governments.  The divestment holding of 
Giannoulias turns on precedents in the Seventh Circuit establishing 
that the market participant doctrine does not extend to city 
governments.274  Giannoulias suggests that a revised statute would 
be upheld if the state limited divestment to state-controlled 
assets.275  The decision also holds that another part of the Illinois 
law, concerning banking services, intruded into the exclusive 
federal realm of foreign affairs, distinguishing that provision from 
divestment.276 
Enter SADA, initially proposed by Senator Richard Durbin of 
Illinois two weeks after Giannoulias.277  As enacted, SADA dispels 
 
271  Baltimore Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 730–57 (following, inter alia, OLC, 
South African Divestment). 
272 Id. at 741–57.  The case also rejects claims of improper delegation and 
impairment of contracts.  Id. at 732–38. 
273 Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 
2007). 
274 Id. at 742, n.3 (citing MIT Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 1980)). 
275 See James Bartlett III, Export Controls and Economic Sanctions, 42 INT’L LAW. 
301, 321, n.137 (2008) (noting that Giannoulias distinguishes between assets 
controlled by the state and those controlled by “sub-state entities”).  Apparently, 
severance of the offending application to city governments is not an option under 
Illinois law.  See Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 750.  Illinois proceeded to enact 
new divestment legislation intended to conform with Giannoulias.  See 15 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 520/22.5 (West 2007). 
276 See Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 745 (“The Court concludes that the 
section of the Illinois Sudan Act that amends the Deposit of State Moneys Act . . . 
unconstitutionally interferes with the Federal government’s power to conduct 
foreign affairs.  The Court reaches the opposite conclusion, however, regarding 
the provisions of the Illinois Sudan Act that amend the Illinois Pension Code.”). 
277 Senator Durbin was the primary sponsor of the Sudan Divestment and 
Accountability Act, S. 831, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), a predecessor bill to 
SADA.  See Combating Genocide in Darfur: The Role of Divestment and Other Policy 
Tools: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin) (urging passage of legislation, 
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the doctrinal clouds over state divestment by expressly authorizing 
it. 
Concerns about the possibility of statutory preemption can be 
removed, of course, by statute.  Congress can likewise clearly 
prevent the application of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 
which, by definition, only applies when Congress is silent.278  
Congress is “the branch responsible for the regulation of foreign 
commerce”279 and, accordingly, Congress has the power to direct a 
different outcome than the courts might otherwise reach.280 
The same result ought to be reached with respect to the federal 
foreign affairs power.  Even Natsios limits its critique of 
Massachusetts’ Burma law by concluding with the sentence: 
“Absent express Congressional authorization, Massachusetts cannot 
set the nation’s foreign policy.”281  Zschernig locates the exclusive 
 
inter alia, authorizing state divestment from Sudan), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&Heari
ngID=6dbf125b-a23e-4084-940f-1c26001043f1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). 
278 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 422–23 (1946) (“[I]t has 
never been the law that what the states may do in the regulation of commerce, 
Congress being silent, is the full measure of [Congressional] power.  Much less 
has this boundary been thought to confine what Congress and the states, acting 
together, may accomplish.”).  Henkin similarly explains that:  
Congress can permit the states to regulate commerce in ways that would 
not stand were Congress silent.  So far as the Commerce Clause is 
concerned, then in principle Congress could authorize the states to 
exclude foreign commerce, to discriminate against it, to impose heavy 
burdens upon it, to satisfy minor local interests at the price of major 
obstacles to such commerce, to establish a patchquilt of local 
idiosyncrasies. 
HENKIN, supra note 181, at 162 (noting that other constitutional constraints would 
remain, such as due process and the ban on states coining money). 
279 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 324 (1994). 
280 See, e.g., id. at 310 (“absent congressional approval”); id. at 324 (“left the 
ball in Congress’ court . . . it could have enacted legislation”); id. at 331 (“we leave 
it to Congress—whose voice, in this area, is the Nation’s”).  The minority opinions 
in Barclays expressly agree with the Court on this point, with Justice Scalia 
commenting that “today’s opinion restores the power to Congress.”  Id. at 332 
(Scalia J. concurring in part); see also id. at 331 (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(concurring in the opinion except one point not here relevant); id. at 334 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
281 Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 77 (1994) (emphasis 
added).  See also id. at 58 (“The Federal government is entitled in its wisdom to act 
to permit the States varying degrees of regulatory authority. . . . We never 
suggested in Japan Line or in any other case that the Foreign Commerce Clause 
insists that the Federal government speak with any particular voice” (quoting 
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federal foreign affairs power in “the President and the Congress.”282  
Garamendi likewise suggests that Congress has the “lead role” in 
foreign commerce, while ultimately declining to address “the 
possible significance for preemption doctrine of tension between 
an Act of Congress and Presidential foreign policy” because that 
case concludes that Congress had “not acted on the matter 
addressed.”283 
Yet the Bush Administration voiced “grave constitutional 
questions” about SADA,284 apparently based solely on the view 
that SADA allows the states to intrude into the federal 
government’s “exclusive authority to conduct foreign relations.”285  
 
Wardair Canada v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1986) (emphasis 
omitted))). 
282 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (emphasis added). 
283 American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 422 n.12, 429 
(2003).  Garamendi distinguishes Barclays on the ground that Barclays concerns 
Foreign Commerce, where Congress is clearly “the preeminent speaker.”  See 
Barclays, 512 U.S. at 329: 
That the Executive Branch proposed legislation to outlaw a state taxation 
practice, but encountered an unreceptive Congress, is not evidence that 
the practice interfered with the Nation’s ability to speak with one voice, 
but is rather evidence that the preeminent speaker decided to yield the floor 
to others (emphasis added).   
Cf. Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1983) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and in judgment) (“[The President] is better able to decide than we are 
which state regulatory interests should currently be subordinated to our national 
interest in foreign commerce.  Under the Constitution, however, neither he nor we 
were to make that decision, but only Congress.”). 
284 Benczkowski Letter, supra note 12, at 67. 
285 Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing S. 2271, 43 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1646 (Dec. 31, 2007) [hereinafter SADA Signing Statement].  The 
SADA Signing Statement reads in relevant part:  
Today, I have signed into law S. 2271, the ‘Sudan Accountability and 
Divestment Act of 2007.’ . . .  This Act purports to authorize State and 
local governments to divest from companies doing business in named 
sectors in Sudan and thus risks being interpreted as insulating from 
Federal oversight State and local divestment actions that could interfere 
with implementation of national foreign policy.  However, as the 
Constitution vests the exclusive authority to conduct foreign relations 
with the Federal government, the executive branch shall construe and 
enforce this legislation in a manner that does not conflict with that 
authority. 
Retired Judge Patricia Wald describes the SADA Signing Statement as “cryptic 
and devoid of any detailed reasoning,” Hearing of the House Financial Services 
Committee on the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act, H.R. REP. NO. 110-87, at 
53, 57, 110th Cong. (Feb. 8, 2008) (prepared statement of Patricia Wald).  The Bush 
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Beyond the just recited details of the case law, the Bush 
Administration’s position is profoundly flawed.286  The 
Administration claims that emanations from a series of specific 
powers granted to the President in Article II amount to a 
generalized foreign affairs power vested in the President so 
sweeping as to trump Congress’ express power to regulate foreign 
commerce.287  The claim that Congress cannot authorize the states 
to act is a claim that Congress itself cannot act.288 
 
Administration declined an opportunity to clarify its position by testifying at a 
House Committee hearing. See id. at 4 (statement of Chairman Barney Frank) 
(“We asked the White House to come and explain the public policy and the legal 
arguments here.  They refused to do it.”). 
 Nevertheless, some additional detail about the Bush Administration’s position 
is found in an earlier Justice Department letter opposing the bill that became 
SADA.  This letter makes clear that the Bush Administration acknowledged that 
Congress has the capacity to cure both statutory preemption and dormant Foreign 
Commerce. See Benczkowski Letter, supra note 12, at 3.  The Administration’s 
“grave constitutional questions” therefore rest solely upon the view that Congress 
cannot authorize State action that intrudes on the “Federal preemptive force that 
flows from the Constitution’s grant to the President of certain foreign affairs 
powers under Article II.”  Id. at 69.  The letter invokes Garamendi, Zschernig, and 
even Crosby in support of its argument for expansive and exclusive federal 
powers.  Id.  Likewise, another Administration letter invokes “the Supremacy 
Clause and the President’s powers thereunder,” which appears to refer less to 
traditional preemption doctrines than to the dormant foreign affairs power.  
Letter from Jeffrey Bergner, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senate, 
at 2 (Oct. 22, 2007), at 61; see also Letter from Jeffrey Bergner, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Harry Reid, U.S. Senate, at 2 (Oct. 22, 2007), at 63. 
286 A leading proponent of SADA questions whether the Bush 
Administration even intended the SADA Signing Statement to be taken seriously.  
See Fowler & Heckscher, supra note 259, at 128 (“The signing statement seems 
more a pro forma marker for this Administration’s philosophy of a strong 
executive than a response to the actual provisions of the legislation.”). 
 Ahdieh is blunter: “Given the statute’s explicit authorization of state and local 
action, the only plausible meaning of the president’s statement would seem to be 
that he enjoys the power to override Congress’ will, in its imposition of sanctions 
against Sudan.”  Ahdieh, supra note 14, at 8 n.43. 
287 See HENKIN, supra note 181, at 89: 
Broad assertions and extravagant adjectives, some of them supported by 
careless rhetoric in opinions of the Supreme Court, might leave the 
impression that the President can exercise virtually all the national 
political power in foreign affairs, at least concurrently with Congress, so 
that in foreign affairs no powers of Congress are exclusive.  That is not 
so . . . [I]t would be difficult for a President to dispute that by vesting in 
Congress ‘all legislative Powers herein granted,’ and then granting 
Congress a comprehensive array of specific powers, the Constitution 
barred the President from exercising the powers specified, even those 
that relate to, or impinge on, foreign affairs . . .  [The President] cannot 
unilaterally regulate commerce with foreign nations . . . . 
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Justice Jackson’s famous Youngstown concurrence is worth 
recalling here.  In considering whether President Truman had the 
authority to nationalize steel mills during the Korean War, Justice 
Jackson wrote that, in areas of concurrent authority, Presidential 
power is “at its maximum” when the President acts with express 
Congressional authority, is “at its lowest ebb” when the President 
acts contrary to a Congressional prohibition, and rests in between 
 
Even advocates of a broad view of executive power over foreign affairs recognize 
that this “residual” power is “limited by specific allocation of foreign affairs 
power to other entities . . . .  [T]he President cannot regulate international 
commerce . . . .”  Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 240, at 235.  Indeed, in arguing 
that the Massachusetts Burma law conflicted with federal power over foreign 
affairs, the Clinton Administration admitted that “[t]he most significant of these 
enumerated powers for present purposes is Congress’s power to regulate 
Commerce with foreign nations” and that “[a] State may petition Congress and 
the President to take action against [a foreign government], including the 
imposition of economic sanctions, or to authorize the States themselves to take certain 
action.” U.S. Amicus Brief in Crosby, supra note 84, at 12, 28 (internal punctuation 
omitted, emphasis added). 
288 In this regard, the Bush Administration opposed the passage of SADA not 
only on grounds of “federalism,” but also of “separation of powers.”  See 
Benczkowski Letter, supra note 12, at 70. 
 To a similar effect, although from a vertical rather than a horizontal 
perspective, is Laurence Tribe’s claim that “neither Congress nor the President 
could permit [state involvement in foreign policy] even if they chose to do so.”  
TRIBE, supra note 217, at 1154 (citing Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in 
Zschernig); see also id. at 657 n.7 (“The result in Zschernig would have been the 
same it seems even if Congress had purported to authorize the states or their 
courts to shape the foreign policy of the United States.”).  Tribe appears to derive 
this approach by analogy from admiralty jurisprudence stressing the need for 
national uniformity.  See id. at 981 n.10.  Indeed, uniformity is crucial sometimes in 
foreign affairs.  See, e.g., Perry S. Bechky, Mismanagement and Misinterpretation: 
U.S. Judicial Implementation of the Warsaw Convention in Air Disaster Litigation, 60 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 455 (1995) (arguing that accomplishment of the treaty objective of 
international uniformity requires greater sensitivity to uniform jurisprudence 
among domestic courts).  But the touchstone of federal dominance over foreign 
affairs is not uniformity per se, but flexibility for the political branches to deal with 
the countless circumstances the nation may face through history.  It would be a 
strange rule of law that vests all power over foreign affairs in the political 
branches to such an extreme degree that they lacked the power to involve the 
states in foreign affairs even in those circumstances where they conclude such 
involvement is in the best interests of the nation.  See HENKIN, supra note 181, at 
165: 
 It is difficult to believe that the Court would find constitutionally 
intolerable state intrusions on the conduct of foreign relations that the 
political branches formally approved or tolerated.  Domestic 
considerations apart, there might be foreign relations reasons why the 
political branches might deem it desirable to leave some matters to the 
states . . . . 
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in “a zone of twilight” when Congress is silent.289  If the President 
were to act to invalidate state divestment within the bounds of 
SADA, his power would be at the nadir.  The President could “rely 
only upon his own constitutional powers” over foreign affairs 
minus the “constitutional powers of Congress” over foreign 
commerce—and also minus whatever powers the states themselves 
might have over divestment of state-controlled assets.  “Courts can 
sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by 
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.  Presidential 
claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be 
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium 
established by our constitutional system.”290 
The reverse of Justice Jackson’s analysis might also be 
considered.  It is tempting to think that Congress’ power is at its 
minimum when opposed by the President’s powers.  But this 
analogy fails.  The power of Congress is binary.  Congress acts 
through legislation, which must be signed by the President or 
enacted by Congress over his veto291—either way, the statute has 
the same constitutional status.  And, if the Jackson analysis does 
work in reverse, President Bush formally added his powers to 
those of Congress by signing SADA.292  Whatever personal 
reservations he might have had when doing so are irrelevant. 
SADA thus clears the doctrinal clouds away from state 
divestment from Sudan, within the bounds set by SADA itself. 
 
289 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
290 Id. at 637–38. 
291 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3 (requiring statutes to be enacted either 
with the President’s approval or over his veto); cf. Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–51 (1983) (declaring the 
legislative veto unconstitutional because it did not involve presentment of 
bicameral action to the President for signature or veto). 
292 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing for the President to sign bills he 
“approve[s]”); see also Negative Implications of the President’s Signing Statement on 
the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Financial Serv., 110th Cong., at 43–44, 48, 50–51 (2008) (prepared statement of Paul 
Schwartz, Counsel to the Sudan Divestment Task Force) (arguing that President 
Bush’s signing statement does not invalidate SADA’s authority to the states 
because, inter alia, the President approved SADA for constitutional purposes by 
signing it). 
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5.3. SADA as Political Standard 
5.3.1. Congressional Flexibility 
In authorizing (but not requiring) states to divest from Sudan, 
Congress left to each state the decision whether to divest state-
controlled assets from Sudan.  Should a state decide to divest from 
Sudan, it also has considerable discretion to decide how to do so. 
But SADA bounds its authority to divest in various respects 
intended to ensure the compatibility of state actions with federal 
policy.  In other words, SADA defines a space where a particular 
form of state expression is plainly authorized under particular 
circumstances.  SADA thus enables us to move past the one-voice 
myth to respect the possibilities offered by a multiplicity of voices, 
while still preserving the ultimate dominance of the federal voice.  
It is the national government that has the authority and 
responsibility to protect the nation as a whole, and so Congress 
must have the capacity to constrain actions (even expressive 
actions) implicating foreign affairs where it concludes such 
constraints are needed to prevent any one state from creating 
unacceptable risks or burdens for the nation.  But this need for 
ultimate Congressional power does not require all states to be 
silent all the time.293 
This space defined by SADA is not fixed, but is changeable by 
federal law.  It is changeable for any reason, including new federal 
policies or priorities, new developments in Sudan, new 
appreciation of the costs and benefits of divestment, or new 
Congressional concern about how the authority is implemented in 
practice.  It is not only changeable, but revocable—and it can be 
replaced by either express preemption or a return to Congressional 
silence. 
 
293 See Bilder, supra note 93, at 830 (“Clearly, any judgments as to what 
constitutes appropriate state or local involvement in foreign affairs ought to be 
made primarily by the political branches, in which the federal foreign relations 
power is lodged.  If state or local action threatens or causes serious interference 
with foreign relations, it is, in the first instance at least, for Congress and the 
President to decide whether to preempt it.”); Davis, supra note 159, at 127–28 
(arguing that states should have as much authority to promote international 
human rights norms as Medellín II gave Texas to resist them, but only “in the 
absence of congressional instructions to the contrary” to avoid “tension with the 
accepted notion that ultimate foreign affairs power rests with the federal 
government.”). 
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Congressional bounding allows the degree of federal control to 
vary over time, depending, for example, on the extent to which 
Congress perceives the needs of the nation, when interacting with 
the world, to allow or preclude state action.294  It also allows for 
different degrees of federal control over state speech directed at 
different targets at the same time.  If a state seeks to divest against 
a country, at a time, or in a manner that Congress deems 
inappropriate, Congress may preempt the action.  Indeed, if four 
states seek to divest from four different countries, Congress has the 
option to preempt one, remain silent on another, expressly 
authorize the third under certain conditions, and expressly 
authorize the fourth under radically different conditions. 
Such flexibility is the essence of political bounding.  While 
SADA-like bills were proposed in the last Congress authorizing 
divestment from Iran and state action on Holocaust-related 
insurance (essentially overturning Garamendi on its facts),295 such 
bills might not pass or might pass with substantially different 
conditions than those included in SADA itself.  Some 
commentators have urged Congress, depending on their own 
preferences, to authorize296 or prohibit297 state divestment in all 
circumstances, but such all-or-nothing approaches ignore the value 
of variable political determinations in light of the overall balance of 
interests affecting a particular matter at a particular time.  
Congress might plausibly conclude that the benefits or costs of 
divestment from another country at another time are greater or 
 
294 Cf. Spiro, supra note 250, at 1242 (describing Zschernig’s “exclusivity 
principle” as a product of its historical cold war context). 
295 The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 
(“CISADA”), S. 3445 & H. R. 7112, 110th Cong. (2008) available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:SN03445:@@@L&summ2=m& 
and http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR07112:@@@L 
&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (as passed by House and Senate Banking 
Committee, but not full Senate).  The Holocaust Insurance Accountability Act, 
H.R. 1746, 110th Cong. (2007), passed the House Financial Services Committee 
with substantial amendments but expired without action by other House 
committees).  See H.R. REP. NO. 110–820 (2008), available at http://thomas.loc.gov 
/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR01746:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 22, 
2009). 
296 See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 6, at 1013–14 (advocating that Congress 
routinely attach a “boilerplate rider to future sanctions regimes that expressly 
approves state procurement measures”). 
297 See, e.g., Dhooge, supra note 154, at 315 (“Congress must also make its will 
known in this area. . . . Congress must clearly preempt such regimes in any future 
legislation in this area.”). 
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lesser than the benefits and costs of divestment from Sudan today, 
or that the circumstances are otherwise different, warranting a 
greater or lesser degree of federal support for state action than is 
set forth in SADA.  Thus, SADA is best understood as setting a 
precedent not in the sense of creating a rule to be followed in the 
future, but of creating a bounded dialogue within borders 
adjustable as appropriate for new circumstances. 
Porterfield and Andrea McArdle propose (separately) that state 
divestment is speech protected by the First Amendment, whether 
as a right belonging to the state itself or a right of individuals 
expressing themselves through the state.298  Leaving aside the 
complexities of the broader questions of First Amendment 
protections for state actors (including libraries and universities) in 
manifold contexts,299 which are beyond the scope of this Article, in 
my view, subjecting Congressional regulation of state divestment 
to First Amendment scrutiny inappropriately “lawifies” what is 
better left to political processes.300  The appropriateness of 
divestment may vary from time to time and from case to case—the 
very antithesis of judicial determinations in a system of stare decisis.  
Moreover, as discussed previously, the main expressive purposes 
of divestment are directed to the democratic process.  But the states 
do not need First Amendment protections to ensure that they have 
a voice in our national political process; their voice is embedded in 
our constitutional structure.301  Congress has never expressly 
 
298 Porterfield, supra note 87; McArdle, supra note 112. 
299 For a recent example highlighting the sensitive, unanswered questions 
that can arise in this area, see United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 
194, 210–11 (2003), where a plurality of the Supreme Court upheld a law that 
conditioned grants to libraries on the installation of anti-pornography filters, 
while declining to decide whether public libraries have First Amendment rights.  
Id.; see generally David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1637, 1688 (2006) (surveying the case law and literature, and arguing for 
a differentiated approach that accords some but not all state speech with First 
Amendment protection because “government speech is neither a pure threat nor 
an unequivocal good, but rather a Janus-like phenomenon with the capacity to be 
either antidemocratic peril to or beneficial participant in the system of freedom of 
expression.”). 
300 Cf. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND 
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 45–50 (1983) (arguing that it is not necessary 
to afford governments constitutional rights in order to advance the public interest 
with regard to governmental speech). 
301 Even less does state divestment need First Amendment protection under 
rationales other than Meiklejohn’s democratic process.  All the goals of human 
dignity and autonomy, search for truth, and character development, are fully 
served by protecting the speech rights of the individuals and associations who 
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preempted state divestment.  Should Congress find sufficient 
national need to overcome the political safeguards of federalism 
and preempt state divestment for the first time, the courts ought 
not invoke the First Amendment as a thumb on the scale for the 
states.302 
5.3.2. Congressional Restraint 
Just as states should exercise the judgment to limit the 
frequency of divestment, Congress should tread lightly with its 
preemptive power—as it has to date.  To support a federal restraint 
on state divestment, Congress should first conclude that the state 
action is imposing a cost on the nation—one might say, as a rule of 
prudence only, a cost that is substantial enough to be unacceptable. 
It may be claimed that divestment gives offense to other 
nations, imposing foreign-policy costs on the United States.  Such 
offense, however, is unlikely to arise from the economics of 
divestment itself.  A divesting state’s sale of securities is effected in 
the vast capital markets, where prices of individual securities and 
the market as a whole may move (sometimes dramatically, as we 
have seen lately) throughout a day.  A sale of a small interest, even 
a sale of a larger interest prudently managed over time,303 is quite 
unlikely to have a sufficiently visible effect on a company’s share 
price to cause genuine offense to that company’s home 
government.  The risk of offense is even less with a state’s decision 
to refrain from purchasing shares. 
If the offense does not arise from the economic impact of the 
divestment, then it would have to arise from the principle of the 
divestment, which is to say the criticism inherent in the 
divestment.  This risk, however, seems remote as well.  We live in a 
nation of 300 million people who are free to criticize other 
governments in a countless variety of ways—including 
 
support the state divestment without any need to extend those rights to the state 
itself.  See Blasi, supra note 164, at 1570 (discussing the rationales for protecting 
free speech). 
302 I am also concerned that an effort by a state to interpose the First 
Amendment as a defense to a foreign-affairs preemption case could lead the 
courts to construe overbroadly the power of government to regulate speech, with 
implications for the civil liberties of all of us. 
303 As mentioned, the model legislation adopted by nineteen states provides 
for disinvestment to be completed over the course of fifteen months.  See MODEL 
LAW, supra note 59, § 4(b)(1). 
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disparaging signs posted outside embassies in Washington, D.C. 304  
Our citizens are free, within only a few limits, to express their 
criticisms through words and images of their own choosing—even 
including “patently offensive” words and images.305  Given these 
conditions, it would seem to require a rather unusual set of 
circumstances for a government to take genuine offense at the 
criticism implicit in state divestment amongst all the express 
criticisms in the surrounding atmosphere that must be tolerated 
under our system.306  And should state criticism cause actual 
offense, it would remain available to the Executive to explain that 
the state—like individuals, organizations, and even individual 
Members of Congress—is not speaking on behalf of the United 
States. 
The downsides of preemption also tilt in favor of 
Congressional restraint.  First, both the economic and democratic-
process gains of a divestment campaign may take some time to 
manifest themselves, so Congress should not act with undue haste 
to end the process.  Second, states must necessarily have the ability 
to manage their assets.  This is a matter both traditionally reserved 
to the states and of great importance to them if they are to remain 
“separate sovereigns” in any meaningful respect.  Finally, the case 
for Congressional tolerance is bolstered by considering the 
alternative.  Imagine a counterfactual scenario where Congress 
expressly preempts state divestment from Sudan and a state wished 
to sell securities in a company that does business in Sudan, 
claiming (as Warren Buffett did with respect to Berkshire 
Hathaway’s sale of PetroChina shares) that its decision was 
commercially motivated.  Congress would have three unappealing 
options:  to prohibit the state from selling any shares in that 
 
304 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988) (invalidating a Washington, 
D.C. ordinance that, in the interest of diplomatic protocol, banned the display of 
signs directing “public odium” or “public disrepute” against a foreign 
government within 500 feet of its embassy). 
305 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (declining to allow 
a public figure to sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by a 
parody that was “patently offensive” and “doubtless gross and repugnant in the 
eyes of most”); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning a 
conviction for disturbing the peace by wearing clothes bearing an obscenity to 
express opposition to the draft). 
306 Cf. McArdle, supra note 112, at 830–31 (arguing that state divestment is 
unlikely to interfere with foreign policy because both the expressive and 
commercial effects are akin to, and difficult to isolate from, those of private 
divestment). 
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company, forcing the state to hold the shares against its will; to 
scrutinize the state’s “true reasons” for the sale; or to accept the 
state’s “avowed” reasons for the sale, thereby creating a ready path 
to circumvent the ban on divestment.307  Congress’ options would 
diminish further when one considers that the line between selling 
shares for “bad” (i.e., “political”) reasons and selling shares for 
“legitimate” (i.e., “commercial”) reasons is not always bright. 
5.3.3. Congressional Opportunity 
One might reasonably argue that this call for Congressional 
restraint is misplaced, that the real problem is not Congressional 
excess, but Congressional lethargy in the face of state measures 
causing harm to the nation.  Peter Spiro thus describes the 
“probability of effective congressional or presidential discipline” 
over state measures as an “illusion[].”308  Spiro argues for leaving 
the policing of state measures to judges, who “are not buffeted (or 
are at least less buffeted) by the sorts of forces that distort political-
branch decision making in these controversies.”309  Howard Fenton 
agrees:  “The political pressures that result in these local laws 
[including their “political popularity”] will also discourage 
Congressional action to preempt such laws in the near term . . . .  
Judicial invalidation is the only realistic option for correction of 
this problem.”310 
There is much truth in these arguments:  our system of checks 
and balances makes it difficult to pass federal legislation under the 
best of circumstances, a situation that may be made even more 
difficult here by “gridlock” in Congress, institutional reluctance to 
constrain the states, the popularity of the state measures at issue, 
and the difficulty of opposing state measures in circumstances that 
 
307 Cf. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 210–16 (1983) (holding that the Atomic Energy Act did not 
preempt California’s regulation of nuclear plants, reasoning that Congress 
occupied the field of nuclear safety, but left states free to regulate nuclear plants 
“for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.”).  Id. at 210–16.  
Indeed, the Court “accept[ed] California’s avowed economic purpose as the 
rationale” for enacting the statute at issue rather than “become embroiled in 
attempting to ascertain California’s true motive,” because “inquiry into legislative 
motive is often an unsatisfactory venture.”  Id. at 216 (emphasis added). 
308 Spiro, supra note 250, at 1253. 
309 Id. at 1253–55. 
310 Howard N. Fenton III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and 
Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 563, 590–92 (1993). 
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may be (mis)perceived as support for the “(usually unappealing) 
foreign country” targeted by the state.311  And Robert Ahdieh aptly 
invokes the “endowment effect”:   “[O]nce states and localities 
have been empowered to act against rogue states such as Sudan, it 
may be difficult to strip them of that power.  As with coffee mugs, 
so with legislative authority.”312 
This Article describes, even celebrates (within limits), the 
possibilities for state divestment in the democratic process: 
attention-getting, norm-changing, door-opening, and assisting the 
pursuit of federal goals.  But these are only possibilities.  States 
may divest and not bring about any national consensus or 
Congressional action.  Congress may prove inattentive, may be 
unable to reach majority (often, supermajority in practice) 
agreement on a course of action, may act ambiguously, or may opt 
for avoidance by leaving politically difficult questions to the 
courts.  Such “failure” may even occur in the majority of cases, 
especially those cases where a divestment campaign fails to attract 
broad horizontal support or other significant attention. 
Accordingly, I do not deny that courts will continue to have a 
role in reviewing state measures—although divestment may 
continue to prove a less tempting target for litigation than other 
state measures.  Should such litigation arise, it might be hoped that 
the courts would abandon the “one voice” myth in favor of a 
dialogic view that gives appropriate weight to the virtues of state 
divestment (and to the vices of federal management of state 
investment decisions).  In the first instance, however, the 
possibilities discussed here are aimed at the political branches 
rather than the courts.  They may act, as in SADA, in a way that 
minimizes the prospects for litigation.  And they may find that the 
idea of bounding presents them with opportunities as well.  While 
Spiro and Fenton posit that the political branches will suffer state 
conduct they deem harmful to the nation for lack of the political 
will to preempt it, 313 bounding offers a happy alternative.  It allows 
Congress to craft politically popular legislation in support of state 
action, while also bounding the states’ authority in ways 
 
311 See Spiro, supra note 250, at 1253, 1255. 
312 See Ahdieh, supra note 14, at 21 n.114 (citing Russell Korobkin, The 
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2003)). 
313 See supra text accompanying notes 308–10 (summarizing Spiro’s and 
Fenton’s arguments that political pressures inhibit effective congressional and 
presidential control over state measures). 
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acceptable to the Congress (and, except in the case of a veto 
override, at least tolerable to the Executive). 
5.3.4. State Restraint 
Where Congress overcomes the “political safeguards of 
federalism” and enacts legislation limiting state divestment, states 
should ordinarily comply with those limits.  Of course, there may 
be circumstances where Congress plainly preempts state 
divestment and the state has no choice but to comply or risk 
litigation.  But there are other circumstances where the states are 
left with more discretion and they should exercise that discretion 
in favor of restraint. 
SADA presents such a case.  SADA’s “nonpreemption” 
provision specifies that divestment within the scope of the statutory 
authorization “is not preempted by any Federal law or 
regulation.”314  It does not expressly address divestment outside the 
scope of the authorization.  Opponents of divestment welcomed 
what they perceived as the negative implications of this provision.  
For example, in a curious statement, the National Foreign Trade 
Council criticized SADA as “unconstitutional” and “flaw[ed],” but 
nevertheless welcomed the law as “one of the more thoughtful 
approaches to divestment” because it “sets strict criteria” and 
“make[s] some legislation currently being considered by state 
legislatures around the country even more dubious from a 
constitutional perspective than they already are.”315  The Council 
presumably believes that SADA “occupies the field” of divestment 
from Sudan or otherwise implicitly preempts divestment beyond 
its bounds.316  Perhaps the Council is right.  But that is a question of 
statutory interpretation, and a state in litigation would have 
counter-arguments (e.g., states have the authority to divest when 
Congress is silent and actions beyond SADA’s authority merely 
remain in that original position). 
States ought not push such arguments.  SADA affords states 
ample space to express their concerns about the horrors in Darfur.  
 
314 SADA, supra note 9, § 3(g). 
315 Jennifer Cummings, NFTC, USA*Engage Release Statement on Sudan Bill, 
Jan. 2, 2008, http://www.usaengage.org/index.php?option=com_content 
&task=view&id=226&Itemid=61 (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (quoting Bill Reinsch, 
NFTC President and USA*Engage Co-Chair). 
316 See supra notes 214–20 and accompanying text (discussing federal 
preemption of state law). 
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Simple prudence urges a state to avoid the risks and costs of 
litigation by conforming its divestment to the bounds of SADA.  
More fundamentally, SADA represents an unprecedented 
Congressional accommodation of state divestment, and states 
should reciprocate with comity and respect for the national 
government’s ultimate control over foreign affairs.317 
5.3.5. SADA as Federalist Dialogue 
As with the federal anti-boycott law, the CAAA, and the 
federal Burma statute, SADA represents a Congressional reaction 
to a state initiative.  Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois first 
introduced the bill that became the divestment provision of SADA 
on March 8, 2007, just two weeks after the Giannoulias decision 
struck down the Illinois Sudan statute on February 23, 2007.318 
Yet, SADA also represents something new.  The federal anti-
boycott law expressly preempts the state laws that had motivated 
it, making it a purely national response319—like a baton passing in 
a relay race, the states have no further role after the federal action.  
The federal Burma statute is silent on preemption,320 but Crosby 
holds it implicitly preemptive—still culminating in a baton pass.  
In the debates leading to enactment of the CAAA, Congress 
considered whether to expressly approve or disapprove state 
 
317 Such comity is indeed reflected in the model law prepared by the Sudan 
Divestment Task Force, which includes definitions, an exemption, and a 
termination clause all aimed at ensuring the compatibility of state law with 
federal bounds.  See supra notes 59–67 and accompanying text (describing the 
Model Law for targeted divestment created by the Sudan Divestment Task Force). 
318 The Senate Report on SADA affirms that SADA represents Congress’ 
reaction to Giannoulias.  S. REP. NO. 110–213, at 3 (2007) (“In unanimously 
approving the legislation, the Committee sought to address the issues raised in 
the Illinois case . . . by clearly authorizing divestment decisions made consistent 
with the standards it articulates.”). 
319 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(c) (2006): 
Preemption—The provisions of this section and the regulations issued 
pursuant thereto shall preempt any law, rule, or regulation of any of the 
several States or the District of Columbia, or any of the territories or 
possessions of the United States, or of any governmental subdivision 
thereof, which law, rule, or regulation pertains to participation in, 
compliance with, implementation of, or the furnishing of information 
regarding restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by 
foreign countries against other countries. 
320 See Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–
166 (1996) (providing for restrictions on foreign aid to Burma, visas for Burmese 
officials, and new investment in Burma). 
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divestment, but the CAAA ultimately remains silent on that 
issue.321  Congress also debated the extent to which it ought to 
tolerate state decisions to terminate contracts with companies that 
did business in South Africa, ultimately adopting a narrow 
provision waiving otherwise applicable federal penalties for 
contract terminations on federally-funded transportation projects 
for a period of ninety days.322  Baltimore Board of Trustees rejects an 
argument that the CAAA implicitly preempted Baltimore’s 
divestment,323 with the result of concurrent federal and state 
actions—a predominantly national policy with a limited measure 
of space for state action arising from a combination of silence and 
limited authority.  In SADA, Congress goes beyond taking the 
policy baton from the states, beyond silently yielding preemption 
determinations to the courts, and beyond a ninety-day toleration of 
limited state authority.  Rather than a national solution, SADA 
adopts an unprecedented federalist solution to a foreign-affairs 
problem—it is, in Judith Resnik’s phrase, “a new iteration of the 
political safeguards of federalism.”324  Congress interposed itself as 
a shield protecting state prerogatives from the national judiciary. 
SADA thus recalls the concept of “Dialogic Federalism”325 or 
“Dialectical Federalism.”326  On this theory of the Constitution, 
 
321 See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 1001–02 (discussing legislative history of the 
CAAA). 
322 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, supra note 74, § 606: 
Notwithstanding . . . any other provision of law—(1) no reduction in the 
amount of funds for which a State or local government is eligible or 
entitled under any Federal law may be made, and (2) no other penalty 
may be imposed by the Federal government, by reason of the application 
of any State or local law concerning apartheid to any contract entered 
into by a State or local government for 90 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act. 
323 See Baltimore Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 740–44 (rejecting the argument 
that the CAAA preempts Baltimore’s divestment ordinances); see also Sanctions 
Against South Africa–Senate Bill Does Not Preempt State and Local Action, 132 CONG. 
REC. S12,534 (1986) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law 
School). 
324 Resnik, supra note 16, at 80 (capitalization omitted). 
325 See Powell, supra note 14 (explaining Powell’s choice of the adjective 
“dialogic” to describe federalism). 
326 Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas 
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).  Although Cover and Aleinikoff 
focus solely on inter-judicial dialogue, in the context of federal habeas review of 
state criminal convictions, their concept of federalist conversation readily extends 
to the political branches as well. 
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federalism is more than a dualist, vertical division of legal 
authority between the national and state governments, with each 
occupying “exclusive and non-overlapping spheres of 
authority.”327  It is a conversation.  This conversation takes place 
amongst governments that share concurrent authority in many 
areas,328 sometimes cooperatively and other times contentiously.329  
This conversation serves constitutional values, including at least 
the hope that conversation will improve policy through 
competition in the marketplace of ideas.  This is all familiar in 
domestic matters, where Justice Brandeis famously described state 
legislatures as laboratories of democracy, but it clearly breaks from 
the one-voice approach to foreign relations.330 
Unlike the baton-passing laws, SADA invites the states to 
continue a dialogue with Congress about Darfur.  It 
internationalizes Brandeis’ laboratories, allowing experimentation 
by the states without—in Congress’ judgment—“risk to the rest of 
the country.”331  It enables the states to ensure that Congress 
attends adequately to Darfur, to create political conditions for 
additional, stronger federal action should the horrors persist.  This 
may serve an internal function within Congress, like a “tickler” 
system to jog Congress’ memory both to contemplate further 
legislation and to oversee Executive efforts on Darfur.  So 
 
327 See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 243, 246–50 (2005) (criticizing “dual federalism” and advancing “interactive 
federalism” as a better alternative, descriptively and normatively). 
328 See id. at 246: 
In many realms, from narcotics trafficking to securities trading to 
education, federal and state laws regulate the very same conduct.  The 
United States Supreme Court long ago blessed this arrangement, and, 
occasional rumblings to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court has 
shown no inclination to attempt to recreate a dual federalist system. 
329 See id. at 249 (“Unlike a purely cooperative model of federalism, a 
polyphonic conception recognizes an important role for competition among states 
and between states and the federal government.  The relationship of the states and 
the federal government may indeed by confrontational rather than cooperative.  
Polyphony accepts a substantial role for dissonance as well as harmony.”). 
330 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave 
responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious 
consequences to the nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”). 
331 Id. 
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understood, SADA may also signal to the President, Sudan, and 
other audiences, domestic and foreign, that Congress (and likely 
the President) will continue to act on Darfur—the same signal sent 
when, for example, the U.N. Security Council ends a resolution on 
Darfur with a public declaration of its “deci[sion] to remain 
actively seized of the matter.”332 
Finally, from the perspective of dialogic federalism, one 
provision of SADA is especially noteworthy.  Section 3(c) expressly 
requires divesting states to give prompt written notice to the 
Justice Department.333  This provision proves that the Bush 
Administration was incorrect when it stated that SADA might 
“immuniz[e]” or “insulat[e]” state divestment from “federal 
oversight” or “federal intervention.”334  To the contrary, this notice 
affords the Executive the opportunity to review each state’s 
actions, to raise any concerns directly with the state, and—if 
necessary—to seek further “intervention” from Congress or the 
courts.  It creates a mechanism for each divesting state to engage in 
a federalist dialogue about Sudan divestment. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Nearly six years have passed since the atrocities began in 
Darfur.  More than four years have passed since the Bush 
Administration identified these horrors as genocide.  Two years 
have passed since Kofi Annan gave his farewell address as U.N. 
Secretary-General at Harry Truman’s Presidential Library, 
declaring: 
 [A]s Truman said, “If we should pay merely lip service 
to inspiring ideals, and later do violence to simple justice, 
we would draw down upon us the bitter wrath of 
generations yet unborn.”  And when I look at the murder, 
rape and starvation to which the people of Darfur are being 
subjected, I fear that we have not got far beyond “lip 
service.”  The lesson here is that high-sounding doctrines 
 
332 S.C. Res. 1755, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1755 (Apr. 30, 2007). 
333 SADA, supra note 9, § 3(c). 
334 SADA Signing Statement, supra note 286 (“This Act risks being interpreted 
as insulating from Federal oversight state and local divestment actions that could 
interfere with implementation of national foreign policy.”); Benczkowski Letter, 
supra note 12, at 67 (“purports to immunize from Federal oversight State and local 
divestment actions that could interfere with national foreign policy . . .”). 
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like the “responsibility to protect” will remain pure rhetoric 
unless and until those with the power to intervene 
effectively—by exerting political, economic or, in the last 
resort, military muscle—are prepared to take the lead.”335 
Yet, as this Article is completed, the ICC Prosecutor states 
simply:  “Genocide continues.”336  Once again, the political will has 
fallen short of the promise of “Never again.” 
The Darfur divestment movement should be understood in this 
context.  It is an effort by citizens of the several states to 
communicate audibly with the national government that 
acquiescence in mass slaughter is intolerable, and to use the 
mechanisms available in our federalist society to build the 
necessary political will in the national government.  Deployed 
wisely, and not too frequently, divestment is capable of attention-
getting, norm-changing, and door-opening.  SADA’s 
encouragement of divestment helps Congress remind itself to 
continue to prioritize Darfur amongst the many issues demanding 
its attention, by extension also prioritizing Darfur for the Executive 
and the international community.  We can imagine the possibility 
of the incoming Obama Administration working with supportive 
state officials to enable President-elect Obama to build a 
Congressional coalition in support of his stated goal “to end the 
genocide in Darfur.”337 
Divestment is costlier than sense-of-the-legislature resolutions.  
It embodies a bottom-up approach to foreign-policy formulation 
that is messy and noisy, posing coordination problems for our 
national leadership.  But the horrors of Darfur make a particularly 
compelling demand for more forceful than normal state speech. 
 
335 Kofi Annan, Former U.N. Sec’y Gen., Address at the Truman Presidential 
Museum and Library (Dec. 11, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/annan.htm) (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
336 Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Office of the Prosecutor, Eighth Report of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the U.N. Security Council Pursuant to 
UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 10 (Mar. 12, 2008), available at http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prose
cutor/reports%20and%20statements/statement/eight%20report%20of%20the%20
prosecutor%20of%20the%20icc%20to%20the%20un%20security%20council%20pu
rsuant%20to%20unsc%201593%20_2005_ (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
337 See Obama-Biden, Foreign Policy: On Africa, 
http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/foreign_policy/#onafrica (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2009) (promising to take “immediate steps” to end the genocide in 
Darfur). 
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Nearly forty years after the International Court of Justice 
declared genocide (and a small number of other gross human 
rights abuses) to be an erga omnes concern of all nations,338 it may be 
that genocide and crimes against humanity (and perhaps a larger 
number of other gross human rights abuses) have emerged as erga 
omnes concerns of all people.339  The perpetrator of genocide or 
crimes against humanity (or perhaps other gross human rights 
abuses), “has become,” as a landmark case describes a torturer, 
“like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, 
an enemy of all mankind.”340  Indeed, this is consistent with the 
literal wording of the Genocide Convention, which requires the 
criminal punishment of all “[p]ersons committing genocide . . . 
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials 
or private individuals”341—that is, the obligation not to commit 
genocide falls “on everyone.”342 
Successive Presidents have failed to stop genocide.  Political 
will failed even in this unique moment when the United States 
officially recognizes for the first time the applicability of its duty 
under the Genocide Convention to prevent an ongoing genocide.  
 
338 See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 
(Feb. 5), reprinted in 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 653, 673 (1970) (“By their very nature, the 
[outlawing of genocide, aggression, slavery, and racial discrimination] are the 
concern of all States.  In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States 
can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes.”); see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections (Bosn. & Herz. v. 
Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 616 (July 11) (“the rights and obligations enshrined by the 
[Genocide] Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes.”). 
339 Cf. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 
564 (Oxford 2006) (“The increasing reliance on complicity as a central concept in 
human rights complaints reflects, in my view, an increased sense of solidarity 
with the victims of human rights abuses in other countries.  It reflects a sense that 
the complainer recognizes that there are now increased responsibilities which 
stretch across borders and that the bearers of those responsibilities are not simply 
a rarefied group of temporary leaders.  The responsibility extends to all of us.”). 
340 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding, in the first 
modern case under the Alien Tort Claims Act, that torture violates the “law of 
nations”). 
341 Genocide Convention, supra note 22, art. IV. 
342 Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Genocide, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW—HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INDIVIDUAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 255, 258, 266 (Installment 8, 1985).  John Knox describes the 
Genocide Convention as the “paradigmatic example” of international law placing 
horizontal duties that “directly bind private actors as a matter of international 
law, rather than indirectly bind them through the operation of domestic law.”  
John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 27–28 (2008). 
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This failure poses an early test of the measure of commitment to 
the new “responsibility to protect.”  We are at risk of seeing our 
national commitment to “Never again” give way to resignation to 
“Yet again.” 
Proponents of divestment urge our national leadership to 
stiffen their spines and find the will to stop the barbarity in Darfur.  
The goal of the divestment movement, then, may be seen as its 
own obsolescence.  It is simply a means to an end:  peace in Darfur. 
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